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VOL. XVII

Peter Harder & Christian Kock

THE THEORY OF PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE

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

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The Theory of Presupposition Failure

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FOREWORD

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University of Copenhagen,
Department of English

P.H. C.K.

PART ONE

The Theory of Presupposition

I. INTRODUCTORY

Our aim is to investigate and classify the speech events which come about when the presuppositions (henceforth PR, in the singular as well as in the plural) of an utterance are not satisfied. In order to do that, we shall suggest a revised definition of PR, and our definition will be wider than current formal definitions – mainly because the phenomena that will qualify as PR according to our definition are alike with respect to what happens when they are not satisfied. But we shall attempt to show that such a wide definition is called for independently of this fact.

We propose to regard as the PR-carrying elements of an utterance all those features in it that serve to indicate the nature of the situation in which the utterance occurs. By 'utterance' we shall understand the *act* of uttering a given string of linguistic elements, not any given, *specific* act of uttering it; in other words, 'utterances' are, to use the terminology of philosophers, locutionary act types (and not tokens; cfr. Garner 1971). PR-carrying elements are, by our definition, all those devices in the utterance that make it *situationally bound.* That an utterance has a PR means that, on account of a PR-carrying device, it is restricted to occurring in situations that exhibit a certain feature, inferable from some feature in the utterance. This feature of the situation we shall speak of as being presupposed by the utterance. Similarly, we shall say that in virtue of its PR the utterance purports to be *situated* in certain distinct respects.

As will be clear below, we understand by 'situation' not just a non-linguistic set of circumstances or 'states of affairs', but also the co-text that surrounds the utterance. That is to say, sometimes a feature of an utterance may permit the inference that a given circumstance is true of the co-text; for examples of this, see, e.g., our analysis of certain adverbials, below, II.8,4.

Furthermore, in all cases where there is a lack of correspondence between the situation in which the utterance purports to be situated and the situation in which it actually occurs, we shall say that a case of *presupposition failure* obtains.

However, for these formulations to be useful, we need to further specify the

notions 'situation', 'circumstance' and 'obtainment'. That is to say, we must ask a) What is the ontological status of the *world* in which a PR obtains? b) What kinds of *circumstances* must, in given cases, obtain in this world? and c) What does it mean for these circumstances to *obtain?* PR theorists usually take the answers to these questions for granted, or they offer answers that are unduly simplified. One result of this is that their notion of PR failure is either non–existent or inadequate.

While the differentiation of the concept of PR failure is our main purpose, and although our 'catholic' definition of PR is mainly motivated by the fact that all instances of PR give rise to closely similar phenomena when they fail, we would also like to emphasize the marked similarity that can be observed between the functioning of different PR when no failure is involved.

It is a well–recognized fact in recent discussions that there is need of a more universally accepted definition of the concept. For example, R. Garner writes, "There is not one concept of presupposition differing but slightly from one person who employs it to another, but several radically different concepts, all of which have been related to the word *presupposition.* The dangers of this are, I trust, sufficiently obvious to require no comment" (Garner 1971, p. 23). Unlike many other students of the subject, we believe that the way out of these dangers is a more catholic, rather than a more restrictive definition.

Our reasons for believing this may be briefly outlined as follows: if PR are all those restrictions that, owing to features in the utterance itself, are put on the situation if it is to 'fit' the utterance, then we can say that the content of any, or nearly any, utterance in a natural language has two components: a) its (purported) *point of departure* and b) its (purported) *point of interest.* The purported point of departure is the sum of its PR, i.e., the sum of the circumstances in which it situates itself; the point of interest is whatever modification it purports to bring to the situation thus designated. That is to say, the content of the utterance consists of two parts: that which it takes for *granted* and that which it purports to *do.* The all-important difference between the two components will hopefully be brought out in the subsequent discussion; therefore one example must suffice, at this point, to illustrate it. There is at least one type of communication which relies crucially on just this distinction, namely the telling of jokes. Consider the following example, which went the rounds a couple of years ago. *N.N.* designates a leading conservative politician of the day:

A: *Did you hear there was a fire in N.N.'s library?*
B: *No — really?*
A: *It was really bad. Both his books were burned.*
B: *No — really!*
A: *Yes, and in one of them he hadn't even finished colouring in the pictures!*

We propose to set up a definition of PR that allows us to say that *A*, in his two last lines, presupposes the following things: first, that N.N. only has two books, and second, that they are children's colouring books, and that N.N. has been occupied filling in the colours. Further, we leave it to the reader's own judgment to discern what a disastrous effect it would have on the joke if A were to *state* these things rather than presuppose them. That is in fact what one would do if one had to *explain* the joke; and as everyone knows, a joke explained is a joke destroyed.

According to the 'classic' definition of PR (cfr., notably, Strawson 1952) a PR of a sentence S is a sentence S' that must be true for S to be either true or false; i.e., a PR of S is something which must hold for S to have a *truth value.*

Connected with this definition is the operational test known as the *negation criterion,* which is taken by most theorists to be logically equivalent to the truth value criterion. Let us assume that for a given pair (S,S') the truth of S' follows from the truth of S as well as from the falsity of S. That the truth of S' follows from the truth of S can be expressed by the symbol $S \Rightarrow S'$. That the truth of S' follows from the falsity of S implies that the truth of S' must follow from the truth of the negation of S ("it is not the case that S"), since the truth of the negation of S is equivalent to the falsity of S. Thus, if $\sim S$ means the negation of S, then the truth value criterion amounts to saying that S' is a PR of S if and only if

$$S \Rightarrow S' \ \& \ \sim S \Rightarrow S'.$$

Differently expressed, the PR of S would then be those parts of the content of S which are not affected by the negation of S.

But it can be shown that neither the truth value criterion nor its logical equivalent, the negation test, will in fact serve to single out all those parts of the content of an utterance which intuitively seem to be presupposed by it. David Cooper (1974) has demonstrated that sentences whose PR are false may well be false or even true, rather than 'truth-valueless'. Generally, it appears that PR-carrying noun phrases do not necessarily render the sentence in which they occur truth-valueless when the PR are false, unless they serve to "identify the *topic* of the sentence, that which the sentences are in some sense primarily about" (Cooper 1974, p. 38; the same point was already noted by Strawson 1964), whereas PR-carrying verb phrases, when the PR are false, only seem to render sentences truth-valueless when they "express the *focus,* in Halliday's sense, of the sentences" (p. 39).

Further, if the lack of truth value in sentences with failing PR is often debatable, as in fact it seems to be, then this very fact means that the criterion of truth value is not universally workable – even if we allow for remedial opera-

tions whereby the concept of truth value becomes applicable to other speech acts than assertions, as attempted, e.g., in Keenan and Hull (1973). On the other hand, it would be circular to try to make the truth value criterion more workable by letting the failure of PR be its criterion.

Ruth M. Kempson (1975) starts out, like Cooper, from the realization that the phenomena described as PR by recent theorists constitute an uncomfortably mixed and incongruous set. Her approach can be summarized in the following claims. The meaning (or meanings) of any sentence have a semantic and a pragmatic component. Semantics represents meaning exclusively in terms of truth conditions (entailments), which must be predicted without recourse to speaker- or hearer-relative concepts. Pragmatics, in Kempson's conception, is based on H.P. Grice's theory of 'conversational implicatures', i.e., occasion-specific inferences superimposed on the invariant semantic meaning of the sentence; these inferences are made, when necessary, in order to make the sentence conform to Grice's 'Co-Operative Principle', which formulates the rules that any utterance should fulfil in order to be a well-formed contribution to conversation (cfr. below, II, 2.). These two components, which are kept rigidly separate, account for the total significance of linguistic utterances. Kempson attempts to make such a notion of semantics and pragmatics plausible by demonstrating that the logical concept of PR, i.e., assumptions that, if false, render the sentence in which they occur truth-valueless, is wholly unnecessary. All alleged cases of logical PR disappear: either a negation of the sentence can be constructed such that the alleged PR is affected by it, in which case the PR is really an entailment; or the alleged PR can be shown to be a speaker-relative conversational implicature, and therefore to belong to pragmatics. Semantics as thus conceived is built on a two-valued logic, i.e., sentences can only be true or false, but not truth-valueless. This also goes for performative sentences, whereas a question or imperative, according to Kempson, can be dealt with if it is analyzed into a sentence-radical and a modal element.

As will be seen, Kempson's conception does not only involve a redefinition of the terms 'semantics' and 'pragmatics'. It is also a theory which says, in essence, that all predictable, i.e., invariant, meaning can be captured in a purely truth-conditional description and without recourse to speaker or hearer. We consider this theory to be demonstrably false and misleading, and we shall offer at least three arguments, each of which we think serves to falsify it. First, we shall attempt to show that although a truth-conditional analysis, as Kempson points out, is unable to predict any difference between *but* and *and*, this difference can in fact be stated in terms of invariant lexical and thus predictable features (II.5.); secondly, that non-anaphoric definite NPs, if a non-speaker-relative, truth-conditional semantics is adopted, either have no truth

conditions at all or a set of truth conditions that is patently counter-intuitive (II.7.); and finally, that certain adverbials have invariant lexical features that a truth-conditional meaning analysis cannot capture (II.8.). Other examples discussed could also be shown to imply consequences inconsistent with Kempson's theory.

It is worth noting that Kempson does not deny the existence of the phenomena usually described in terms of logical PR, but simply relegates them from semantics to pragmatics — where they emerge as 'speaker-assumptions' derived from the Gricean conversational maxims. Thus, she has in effect rolled together two classes of phenomena which are related, but which certain theorists have tried to keep apart, namely 'classic' PR and implicatures (or 'présupposés' and 'sous-entendus', cfr. Ducrot 1969). Here is, in fact, a point where we wholly agree with her. A sharp distinction between these two types of PR phenomena is, in our view, misleading. But the attempt to build an impenetrable wall between PR phenomena and linguistic semantics is equally doomed to failure.

Cooper proposes to establish a new definition of PR which is in keeping with the non-formal definition in Fillmore (1971a). Fillmore writes:

"Sentences in natural languages are used for asking questions, giving commands, making assertions, expressing feelings, etc. . . . We may identify the presuppositions of a sentence as those conditions which must be satisfied before the sentence can be used in any of the functions just mentioned" (Fillmore 1971a, p. 380). In the same vein, Cooper construes PR as "ontological conditions" which must be satisfied if the speaker is to succeed in the intention of performing any such speech acts as mentioned by Fillmore. In order to perform any speech act one must have the intention to do it. But one cannot even *intend* to, e.g., assert a predicate about a subject that one does not think exists. And taking the PR of existence in assertions as the paradigm case, Cooper goes on to extend this type of analysis to other types of speech acts. All speech acts, he holds, can be reshaped to the form of an illocutionary force plus a propositional content which can be expressed by the formula *a is* Θ. Correspondingly, the general formula for PR is that *'a' should be satisfied,* in a wide sense of 'satisfaction' of which 'existence' is only a special case. What the 'satisfaction' consists in may vary from case to case; it may be 'occurrence', 'instantiation', 'obtainment' etc. Some such ontological condition will invariably attach to the *intending* of any given speech act; and that the speech act is intended is of course a condition for its success (cfr., e.g., Strawson 1973).

Like Cooper, we intend to formulate our notion of PR in terms of the speech act theory of meaning. However, a consistent application of this point of view to the analysis of actual speech events will necessitate a modification of Coop-

er's account. Further, once PR are defined as conditions for the success of intentions expressed in linguistic acts, it seems to us that an even wider and more 'catholic' definition becomes natural.

First, however, the notion of 'satisfaction' needs further analysis. We do not think this concept is adequate for the job it is being put to as long as one takes it to refer only to existence, occurrence, instantiation or obtainment *per se*. Cooper takes the utterer's *belief* that *a* is satisfied as a necessary condition for asserting or whatever speech act the utterer is intending; and he then takes "the satisfaction of *a*" as such as a necessary condition for the *success* of the assertion (cfr.p.97). But *where* exactly should this ontological condition, whatever its nature, be satisfied? It could not simply be in some Wittgensteinian world of all obtaining states of affairs. An assertion would not actually serve its communicative function as an assertion unless its ontological conditions were satisfied in the *hearer's* world – even if they were satisfied *per se* in some sense; that is to say, the hearer must *believe* them to be satisfied. On the other hand, if the conditions are satisfied in the hearer's belief as well as in the speaker's, the assertion *will* serve its communicative function, no matter how much an outside observer might object they are not satisfied *per se*. The mode in which a PR is satisfied is that it is recognized as being satisfied by the speaker and hearer in conjunction. We will say that it should belong to the *background assumptions* (henceforth *BA)* of the speaker and hearer (henceforth *S* and *H).*

But when PR emerge as conditions to be satisfied *in the BA* in the situation, the perspective has changed slightly in relation to Cooper's account. The extended notion of PR that we will propose reflects the same tendency. In order to make clear how our definition is to be understood, we shall need the concept *communicative function* (henceforth *CF).*

The concept of CF is closely related to 'speect act' and 'illocutionary act', but these concepts seem to us to contain features which provide obstacles to an account of PR in terms of speech act conditions. A complete speech act must include an illocutionary force, which, however, may not be indicated in the utterance itself. If a speaker intends to perform a promise with the utterance *I'll come,* a number of conditions must be satisfied – but since *I'll come* could also be used to perform many other speech acts (e.g., a threat), these conditions cannot be construed as conditions on the *utterance,* and therefore not as PR. To avoid this difficulty, we shall define the CF of an utterance as that which the utterance purports to do *in virtue of linguistic elements within it.* (In using the term 'linguistic' elements, we are of course begging the question as to the status of borderline phenomena, e.g., prosodic features. In the sentence *John called Mary a virgin, and then SHE insulted HIM,* drawn from Lakoff 1971, the contrastive stresses introduce the PR that to be called a

virgin is an insult. Most linguists would probably call such features 'linguistic' elements. But where the line is to be drawn is immaterial to our argument, as long as it is drawn to comprise just those elements which are used in accordance with *conventions.)* The CF, we shall say, is that part of the intended function of the utterance which is explicitly indicated in the utterance itself. Thus, no matter how *I'll come* may be meant in an actual situation, its CF will always be that of *stating* that something is the case.

Our second modification in relation to the concepts of speech act and illocutionary act as usually understood is necessitated by the fact that these terms are generally taken to refer to entire *classes* of acts, such as the speech acts of asserting, promising, threatening, etc. We, however, will want to say that the CF of an utterance is not just that class of functions to which its function belongs, but its *particular* function – not the function of making, e.g., an assertion, but the function of making a *specific* assertion.

We have now prepared the ground for our definition of PR, which is the following:

The PR of a given utterance are all those conditions that must be satisfied in order for the CF of the utterance to come about – excluding those conditions which must hold for an utterance to come about *at all.* (Cfr. Searle 1969 on 'normal input and output conditions'.)

Our concept of the PR of an utterance, then, includes everything that must belong to the BA of both S and H as conditions for the success of the (explicitly indicated) CF of the utterance. Therefore the relevant heuristic procedure in the discussion of different types of PR is to look at utterances as they stand in order to ask what kinds of conditions they may raise regarding the BA of the interlocutors.

This definition is closely related both to Fillmore's informal one (see p. 11) and to Cooper's. Yet differences will appear when, in the following section, we demonstrate how we want to apply the concept.

Like Cooper, we see PR as conditions for the success of a speech act. But we shall include a wider range of phenomena under the heading of PR. This will emerge in the subsequent listing of types of PR. We shall arrange types of PR according to the hierarchical level of the linguistic elements to which they attach. Especially on the highest levels – those of the *code,* the *utterance* and the *conjunction* of sentences – we find that there are conditions at work which are not usually included in typologies of PR.

II. TYPES OF PRESUPPOSITIONS

We should emphasize that, in the following discussion of various kinds of PR phenomena, we are speaking in terms of *ideal* and *straightforward* communication. Therefore, we shall say that a CF 'comes off' only if perfect understanding ensues without necessitating any allowances, remedial operations or accomodation measures *at all.* When anything else happens, the CF will be described as 'not coming off', or the utterance as 'infelicitous' or 'ill-formed'. In all such cases, we shall see an instance of PR failure; thus PR failure does not mean that communication has broken down, but simply that it is not ideal and straightforward.

1. Code: appropriateness

The hierarchically highest PR-carrying unit we shall discuss is *the code* in which the message is formulated, since the code typically extends over a whole stretch of utterances. Because of the traditional assumption of a linguistically homogeneous community the code has not usually been considered as a PR-bearing element. That assumption, however, has in recent years been shown to be very unrealistic. In its place the notion of 'linguistic repertoire', to use Gumperz's term (cfr.Gumperz 1964), has emerged as a more adequate conception of everyday linguistic behaviour. This view, which has been demonstrated in a large number of sociolinguistic works during the last decade, implies that every competent speaker has at his disposal a number of different linguistic forms for use in different situations. These forms may differ with respect to phonology, grammar, or lexis, or any combination of these. Bilingual communities are special cases only in that they use two sets of forms which are totally different; linguistic variety as such is not the exception, but the rule.

Insofar as, in a given community, there are rules specifying 'what language to speak to whom and when' (cfr.Fishman 1969, 1971), an utterance in a certain code is well-formed only to the extent that these rules have been observed. Putting it in our terms: in cases where a certain type of CF requires the choice of a specific code, that CF cannot come off unless the speaker in fact chooses just that code. The following quotation from Frake (1964) is illustrative:

"To ask appropriately for a drink among the Subanun it is not enough to know how to construct a grammatical utterance in Subanun translatable in English as a request for a drink. Rendering such an utterance might elicit praise for one's fluency in Subanun, but it probably would not get one a drink . . . Our stranger requires more than a grammar and a lexicon; he needs . . . a specification of what kind of things to say in what message forms to what kinds of

people in what kinds of situations".

The failure to get the drink is due not to illwill on the part of the Subanun, but to the failure of a PR.

Similar examples in English would be especially obvious in delicate matters like greetings or address forms, cfr. Ervin-Tripp (1969). If the wrong choice of either

(1) *Hi, Joe*

or

(2) *Good afternoon, Professor Carruthers*

were made in a given situation, anything but a happily executed greeting might be the result. If, as in this case, the CF of an utterance in a specific code cannot come off unless certain situational cimcumstances are present, these circumstances will be a PR of the utterance.

2. Communicative function: non-redundancy and relevance

The next PR-carrying type of unit in our typology is the *communicative function* itself, regardless of the code in which it is formulated. Those PR tied directly to the CF to the utterance will be such as are not due to any single part of the utterance; and when a PR of this kind fails, the CF is therefore prevented from coming off because *as a whole* an utterance with such a CF is inappropriate to the situation in which it occurs. When would this be the case? Or differently put, what conditions must be met by all CFs?

H.P. Grice (1968) seems to have been the first to consider this problem. He sets up what he calls the 'Co-Operative Principle' to account for the fact that in order for communication to be successful more must be taken into account than the literal formulation of utterances. The rules specifying in what ways the interlocutors must be co-operative are stated in certain 'maxims of conversation'. Not all of these principles are relevant from our point of view, since their status as descriptive rather than normative rules does not appear incontestable. (Grice states, among other things, the maxims that one should not say what one believes to be false or that for which one lacks adequate evidence.) The rules that are interesting from our point of view are the following:

Quantity:

(A) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

(B) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Relation:

(C) Be relevant.

These maxims are related to three 'laws' formulated by Oswald Ducrot (1972): the laws of 'exhaustivité', 'informativité' and 'interêt'. Ducrot's formulation seems in one respect to be superior, since there is some overlapping between (B) and (C) above: when an utterance is more informative than is required, it may be either because it informs the hearer of something he knows already or because it is irrelevant.

We propose that *two* general rules regarding the CF as such are sufficient to cover the PR that must hold in order for the CF of an utterance to come off. These two rules correspond closely to Ducrot's laws of 'informativité' and 'interêt', respectively, as well as to Searle's conditions 5 and 4 for the well-formedness of speech acts (cfr. Searle 1969, pp. 59-60). The first rule, which we shall call the condition of *non-redundancy,* states that the CF must not already belong to the BA. With Searle's example, "a happily married man who promises his wife that he will not desert her in the next week is likely to provide more anxiety than comfort. Similarly, one cannot, strictly speaking, give anybody information that he already has." But not only must the CF be non-redundant. It must also be *relevant,* or interesting, i.e., be connected with the BA in such a way that the utterance appears to *justify* itself. Even if it is perfectly true that, e.g., *Syntactic Structures* appeared in 1957 and your hearer is unaware of this fact, it is not always communicatively felicitous to tell him so. Similarly, Searle's rule 4 states that, in the case of promising, the BA must contain the assumption that the hearer *wants* the speaker to do the thing that he promises to do. If he does not care, the promise is defective, because it is irrelevant.

We stated initially that our main purpose was to describe types of PR failure. We are still in the preparatory phase of that inquiry; however, the PR attached to the CF of utterances require a special discussion with respect to what may happen when they fail, and a digression might therefore be in order here. The question, then, is: what happens if the rules of non-redundancy and relevance are violated?

The extension of what exactly, at a given time, is non-redundant or relevant to a given pair of interlocutors is of course entirely dependent upon their momentary set of mind. The consequent unpredictability of the nature of the event resulting from an utterance is, however, no argument against the existence of the two *rules:* all possible courses of events are entirely dependent on the awareness of both S and H that a CF is meant to be non-redundant and relevant. Consider the utterance

(3) *It is cold*

If the hearer is in the same room as the speaker, this utterance will probably violate the non-redundancy condition. But the knowledge on the part of the hearer that the speaker would not make the utterance if he thought it were re-

dundant opens up three possible courses of action to the hearer:

1) he can correct this assumption, saying for instance, "I know";
2) he can suspend his own sense of obviousness, thereby 'covering up' the speaker's misjudgment: "I believe you're right";
3) the most interesting possibility, however, and the one that justifies the present digression, occurs if the hearer thinks the violation was made *on purpose*. The hearer's interpretation would then proceed on the following lines: the speaker points out an obvious fact; but this makes sense only if he thinks that in some way it is not obvious *enough*: "Now why does he think that it is not obvious enough to me, if it is obvious to him? Maybe because *if* it were obvious to me, I would take consequent action, such as lighting a fire, closing the window, or turning on the electric heater."

Similarly with a violation of the *relevance* rule. Even if the CF of an utterance is not immediately relevant, the hearer will act on the assumption that it was intended to be relevant and look for a way to connect it with the BA. A case in point would be

(4) *The temperature outside is exactly 0.2 degrees*

This will probably not be redundant in the sense that the hearer knows it already, but neither will it be strikingly relevant; however, if the door is open, a shrewd hearer will probably consider closing it.

The interpretative mechanisms just discussed (cfr. below, IV.1 and 2) yield derived interpretations known as 'sous-entendus' or, in English, conversational 'implicatures' (Grice), and they thus help the hearer to superimpose the appropriate illocutionary force on the CF. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) present a set of rules designed for the same purpose. They also base their theory on well-formedness conditions, such as sincerity and reasonableness conditions. It seems to us, however, that the actual functions of their 'conversational postulates' are in fact dependent on notions like relevance and non-obviousness. One conversational postulate that they set up is (5).

(5) *One can convey a request by (i) asserting a speaker-based sincerity condition or (ii) questioning a hearer-based sincerity condition*

They set up this postulate to explain why the sentences of (6) can all be interpreted as requests:

(6) *a. I want you to take out the garbage*
b. Can you take out the garbage?
c. Would you be willing to take out the garbage?
d. Will you take out the garbage?

Whereas the sentences of (7) do not convey a request:

(7) *a. I suppose you're going to take out the garbage*

b. Must you take out the garbage?
c. Are you likely to take out the garbage?
d. Ought you to take out the garbage?

There are some very general problems involved here, and an exhaustive discussion would be very long and complicated. However, while (6 a–d) admit more easily of being interpreted as requests, it seems to us that if the removal of garbage was a job the assignment of which had been the subject of repeated controversies in the family, *any* utterance involving a proposition concerning this matter, including (7 a–d), might be taken as a request, even though (b) and (d) would be heavily ironical. On the other hand, in the case of a proposition that is not so readily associated with a request as the taking out of garbage, the interpretation of the equivalents of (6) would not be as uniform. Consider (8):

(8) *a. I want you to live on $ 1200 a year*
b. Can you live on $ 1200 a year?
c. Would you be willing to live on $ 1200 a year?
d. Will you live on $ 1200 a year?

The most natural interpretations of (8) would probably take (a) to be a request and (b) and (d) to be sincere questions, while (c) would probably be seen as a rhetorical question. The reason why (a) remains a request would not seem to be the circumstance that it involves a sincerity–condition; a more probable interpretation, from our point of view, would be that in so far as the wants of somebody else are felt to be of relevance, one is to a certain degree responsible for their satisfaction, especially if they involve one's own actions. But this seems to be a question of 'natural ethics' rather than natural logic.

One special application of the relevance rule deserves mention here, viz. the one corresponding to the 'law of exhaustivity'. Telling *part* of the truth is in fact just a special way of being irrelevant; if somebody says that Joe was expected home a month ago, this detail would be relevant only in the case that the expectation had not been fulfilled – otherwise the relevant piece of information would be that he had returned. What the law of relevance says is thus not only that a CF should be relevant with respect to the *situation,* but also that it should be relevant relative to what *else* could be said about the matter.

Ducrot (1969, 1972) seeks to distinguish 'sous–entendus' from the 'classic' PR by saying that unlike PR, sous–entendus are affected by negation. Consider, e.g.,

(9) *The captain was sober yesterday*

where the implicature is that the captain is usually drunk, which is not the case in

(10) *The captain was not sober yesterday*

But this is a different *utterance* from (9), with a different CF, and as it is precise-

ly the CF of the utterance and not any individual part that has implicatures, it is of course to be expected that the implicatures of (9) and (10) are different. In order to see whether the implicature of the CF in (9) will in fact be affected by negation we should therefore negate the utterance (9) *in toto* ('outer negation') – rather than construct a different utterance which happens to be the negation of (9) ('inner negation'). We would then get something like

(11) *It is false that the captain was sober yesterday*

Now it seems to us very debatable what is affected by this negation – which again goes to show that negation is not such a dependable criterion after all. But at least it does not seem implausible to say that the notion of the captain's habitual drunkenness is a condition for the non-redundancy of (11) just as it is a condition for the non-redundancy of (9). In short, it seems that it is not implausible to group implicatures, found by applying the laws of non-redundancy and relevance, together with the 'classic' PR. Or better: although there is often more than one possible implicature for a given CF, it seems safe in any case to say that it is a PR of *any* utterance, just as implacable as the classic PR, that the BA in the situation do not make it redundant or irrelevant. (For a discussion of the basic structural similarity between conversational maxims (laws of discourse) and classic PR, see section IV, on 'The basic structure of PR'.)

Cooper's concern in connexion with implicatures is to show that in a sentence like

(12) *I bought the car voluntarily*

the implicature, namely that there was something 'fishy' about the car, is not a PR. He says that in such cases "it is the *act*, and manner, of assertion which, if anything, carries the relevant presuppositions" (Cooper 1974, p. 112), and he goes on to say that "it is not generally true that utterances of sentences containing this word [voluntarily] suggest 'fishiness' " (p. 113). That may be so, and it is precisely this shifty nature of implicatures that makes Ducrot and Cooper refuse them a place among 'true' PR. It is true that both (9) and (12) may have several different implicatures; for (9) it may also be *The whole rest of the crew were drunk yesterday*, and for (12), *Generally I would never dream of buying a car*. But even if implicatures change with the situation and the linguistic context, two requirements still remain constant, namely that utterances like (9) or (12) must be non-redundant and relevant. These are the PR attached to the CF of all utterances – whether they are assertions, requests, promises or whatever.

3. Texts: coherence

From implicature there is only a short step to what is known in rhetoric as el-

lipsis. Any utterance is normally made under the PR that it should be *coherent*, i.e., that every part of it is somehow in continuation with what has gone before. Thus, if the speaker without explaining omits something so that the continuation is not apparent, the reader will assume that he is meant to reconstruct the 'missing link' on his own, and that he will be able to do so; otherwise the coherence rule is violated. An example, drawn from Chapter Twelve of Jerome's *Three Men In a Boat*, is

(13) *I took the mast and poised it high up in the air, and gathered up all my strength and brought it down.*

It was George's straw hat that saved his life that day. He keeps that hat now . . .

Harris got off with merely a flesh wound.

In a case like this, *either* the reader inserts the missing link, namely that the narrator, in trying to hit the unmanageable pineapple tin referred to in the context, missed it and hit his companions instead; *or* the utterance is incoherent. As in the case with apparent violations of the laws of non-redundance and relevance, the reader acts on the assumption that in spite of the apparent violation the law of coherence is in fact fulfilled. Only if all attempts at supplying the missing link fail will he reject the utterance as ill-formed.

4. Juxtaposition: cooperation

From ellipsis, again, there is only a short step to the case of an utterance consisting of two juxtaposed sentences; in interpreting them, one automatically makes use of the same kind of reasoning that was demonstrated above. Consider (14):

(14) *He is heavily depressed. His mother has come to see him*

What is presupposed in an utterance such as this? Again, some kind of coherence seems to be required; the two sentences must *cooperate* in some way. An obvious possibility is the cause-effect relation, yielding two possible ways of interpreting the utterance as coherent; but other 'cooperative' relations are also possible, for instance if (14) is the answer to a request: *Give me two good reasons for not inviting him to the cinema.*

A possible objection must be considered here. What if a text or utterance is not *intended* to be coherent? How do we exclude cases like (15):

(15) *Shakespeare died in 1616. Let's go home and eat*

However, there seems to be intuitive justification for a distinction here. One would say that in (15) the situation is changed as the speaker passes from the first to the second sentence – in fact this change could be said to be the *purpose* of the second sentence. Our 'cooperation condition' above can thus be amended to say that in juxtaposing two sentences the speaker must either make

it clear that he intends to start something new *or* make sure that the second sentence in some way cooperates with the first. The second case, from the point of view of the utterance, can be described in accordance with our PR definition: the CF of an utterance consisting of two juxtaposed sentences cannot come about unless the BA makes it clear in what way the two sentences are intended to cooperate.

5. Conjunction: types of cooperation specified

The notion of the 'cooperation' between the parts of an utterance turns out to be valid also when the parts are joined together by means of conjunctions. The only difference is that when conjunctions are used, this reduces the element of conjecture in interpreting exactly how the parts cooperate.

We shall discuss only two typical cases, and only with respect to sentence conjunction, namely *and* and *but.*

Robin Lakoff (1971) maintains that there are two kinds of *and* – *a priori* not an attractive point of view. There is a) symmetric *and,* which indicates that the conjuncts are to be seen as having a *common topic* – although this may only be discernible given certain background assumptions and a certain amount of deduction. Then there is b) asymmetric *and,* which may indicate either causality or temporal sequence between the conjuncts. Lakoff considers (a) and (b) to be related, interpreting causality and temporal sequence as special cases of common topic. It is difficult to see, however, in what way the possible causal relation between the conjuncts in an utterance like *Honoria had twins, and Roderick fainted* may be said to constitute a 'topic' in the usual sense of the word. Moreover the distinction between (a) and (b) makes it necessary to set up a number of contextual restrictions for each of the two types. It would seem to be more natural to say that there is only one type of *and,* and that different interpretations involving either symmetry or asymmetry may be put on it according to context. One argument for this is that in many cases both types of interpretation are possible in the same utterance, as in *Roderick has been staying with us, and now my wife is pregnant.* Here the relation may be either symmetric, if for example the utterance is an answer to *Why have you been so worried lately?* or the interpretation may involve temporality or even causality. But whichever is the case, it seems to hold generally that *and* presupposes a *cooperation on an equal basis* between the conjuncts in establishing the function of the utterance as a whole. This function may be, e.g., to support a given potential conclusion, in which case the order of the conjuncts is reversible; or it may be to *narrate* a temporal series or a causal chain of events. In this case the order of the conjuncts is irreversible, but nevertheless they have an

equal status in relation to the overall function of the utterance, since each conjunct supplies one link to the chain or series. If we take it that the meaning of *and* is to introduce the PR of 'equal status of the conjuncts with respect to the overall function of the utterance', then the symmetry or asymmetry of which Robin Lakoff speaks will be seen as features following from the interpretation one puts on *and* in order to make the utterance conform to this PR.

Thus, while the notion of 'common topic' cannot very plausibly be brought to cover all cases of conjunction with *and,* it is still possible to show that in every case *and* introduces a PR of a very general nature, describable only in terms of function. For instance, the alleged *reductio ad absurdum* example which Kempson advances against Robin Lakoff may, based upon our analysis, be turned against Kempson herself: *I'm going to tell you two quite unrelated facts: the Academic Board has vetoed the recent suggestion that all colleges should have course unit degrees, and I think I'm pregnant.* As will be seen, the two conjuncts of *and* do exactly what our analysis predicts: they go together on an equal basis to bring about the CF which is so neatly announced in the utterance: that of telling the hearer two quite unrelated facts.

But is more difficult. However, Kempson's claim that it is "doubtful whether a semantic analysis can predict any contrast between *but* and *and*" (p. 57) is merely an avowal of the utter explanatory impotence of her theory. Many facts concerning *but* point in the direction of an account closely comparable to the one given of *and* above. As before, Robin Lakoff sets up two types: *but* presupposes either a lexical opposition between the conjuncts, or an expectation on the part of the hearer of the opposite of the second conjunct ('contrary-to-expectation' *but)* (cfr.p.133). It is the latter type that presents difficulties. Kempson advances the counter-example *John wants an ice cream, but so do I,* as occurring "in a situation where there is not enough money to buy us both ice cream, so neither of us can have one" (p. 57). Does this make it impossible to maintain the intuitive notion of 'contrast', as Kempson would have it? Again, it seems that only a functional description can take care of all the facts. The contrast or antithesis should not be construed as an internal one involving either contradiction or lexical opposition. Instead, the conjuncts should be seen as antithetical *in relation to a given potential continuation.* Typically, the first conjunct can be seen as *supporting* a given inference, whereas the second conjunct *undermines* it. *John wants an ice cream* works toward the conclusion that we should buy him one, but precisely in the situation where we cannot both have one, the conjunct *So do I* works *against* this conclusion. This explanation makes a dual interpretation of *but* superfluous. Instead, *but* is seen as always introducing the same PR, namely that the second conjunct runs counter to a continuation that one would be given to expect on the basis of the first conjunct and the BA in the situation. In

other words, by prefixing *but* to the second conjunct, the speaker *situates* it in a context where it contradicts a continuation to be expected in the light of the first conjunct. The provocative effect of examples like *Harry is Republican, but honest* is due to the fact that one is expected to interpolate a conclusion from Harry's Republicanism which contrasts with his honesty.

Besides the PR of antithesis as here described, utterances with *but* often have an occasion-specific implicature that the second conjunct 'outweighs' the first, i.e., not only runs counter to the potential conclusion, but actually refutes it, since otherwise the second conjunct might not live up to the PR of relevance. However, it should be emphasized that the existence of some conclusion which the first conjunct supports and the second conjunct undermines is an invariant, and not occasion-specific, feature of utterances with *but*. It should therefore be accounted for by any semantics purporting to predict the meaning of utterances in natural languages, notwithstanding the fact that a truth-conditional analysis cannot capture it.

One final remark. If we take Kempson's example from above and substitute *but* for *and*, we get *I am going to tell you two quite unrelated facts: the Academic Board has vetoed the recent suggestion that all colleges should have course unit degrees, but I think I'm pregnant*, which seems contradictory, as *but* necessarily implies a relation. No matter how one chooses to interpret *and*, the intuitive contradiction involved in the version with *but* seems to make it necessary a) to assume a semantic difference between *and* and *but* and b) to assume *some* kind of relation between conjuncts with *but*, although it need not be an internal one. (For a comparable analysis of *but*, on which we have been leaning heavily, cfr. Ducrot 1973b, p. 226.)

6. Sentence structures: fact

Inside the sentence, we begin to meet the phenomena that have traditionally been classed as PR.

Wh-questions presuppose the factiveness of the proposition: *When did George come back?* is ill-formed if George has not come back. Similarly in the case of cleft sentences: *It was George who murdered the grocer* presupposes the fact that *someone* murdered the grocer. Also pseudo-cleft sentences carry a PR: *What John did was to burn down the garage* presupposes that John did *something*. These phenomena, however, do not require extensive discussion, since they are familiar from the linguistic literature.

Finally, there are such PR as are attached to the constituent elements of the clause.

7. PR attached to the NP

1) Definiteness: identifiability. Probably no type of PR has raised so much discussion as this, from Frege through Russell and onwards. Among expressions usually ascribed to the group of definite NPs are personal and demonstrative pronouns; proper names; and definite, possessive and demonstrative descriptions (cfr., e.g., Strawson 1964). Before we turn to the paradigm case of PR in the philosophical debate, the definite description, we shall look briefly at some of the other phrase types.

The personal and demonstrative pronouns belong to a small and interesting group of expressions, known as 'deictics'. The common feature of all such expressions, including adverbs like *now, here* etc., is that their meaning involves a reference to the situation. All deictic expressions can be described as presupposing those features of the situation on which their interpretation depends.

In many cases, these features will coincide with the 'normal input and output conditions', insofar as communication without a speaker and a hearer, a time and a place of interaction is difficult to envisage. In cases, typically of written communication, where problems do occur, what ensues is typically a simple breakdown of communication; the 'situation' is defective, so to speak. Therefore failure of PR involving deixis is not, from our present point of view, of prime interest.

The definite description is like the deictics in an important way, *viz.* that the hearer is requested to *identify* something that the speaker wants to involve in the communication. Only in the case of the deictics can this identification be performed *solely* by the aid of features (purportedly) present in the situation, whereas the definite description includes, as the name implies, a description, long or short, of the object in question.

A general way of formulating the issue is to say that definite expressions must have a *reference* in order for the utterance in which they occur to have a CF. In our discussion of this problem, our point of departure will be the exposition in Searle (1969), according to which there must exist at least one and not more than one object to which the utterance of the NP applies; further, the hearer must be given sufficient means of identifying the object from the utterance, and this means that either the NP must be an identifying description or the speaker must be able to *produce* such a description on demand (cfr.Searle 1969, chap. 4, *passim).* But this account, while illuminating, is hardly satisfactory. How can the hearer be content to know that the speaker could produce an identifying description on demand, if for example the speaker is a lecturer on TV, who is not in a position to respond to the demand? In other words, can we say that the NP has a reference if only the speaker himself knows what he is talking about? Hardly. To intend to refer to something must be to assume that the hearer will be able

to perform the identification required on the basis of the utterance as it stands.

The problem is that Searle is trying for a strict and uniform criterion of reference, whereas in the nature of the case the criterion is not strict and uniform. *The conditions for the coming off of an intended reference are relative to the purpose at hand.* That is to say, it is the nature of the CF that determines how strict the conditions for reference are in each case — which goes to show that it is natural to define the concept of PR relative to that of CF. In a sentence like

(16) *The land of the Greeks is a lovely one*

the CF comes off if one simply knows that the Greeks are the people who live and have always lived in such and such a place. In

(17) *The language of the Greeks is likely to fill us with wonder*

uttered by a professor of linguistics, the CF is of such a kind that one has to know whether it is the *ancient* Greeks or the *modern* Greeks that are being referred to. Plainly the requirements for reference are different in the two cases, *relative to the nature of the CF.* Probably the source of the difficulties is that it seems to be implied that the 'object' referred to 'exists' 'uniquely' in *the world as such,* rather than in *the world as the hearer sees it.* In other words it is the concept of the hearer's BA that is needed.

Our conclusion, then, is: *what is presupposed by the occurrence of a referring NP in an utterance is that degree and kind of unambiguous identification in the BA of the hearer which is necessary for the CF of the utterance to come about.*

Kempson claims that the condition that the hearer should be able to identify the referent has no place in semantics, as it is not a truth condition: "The truth of any of the statements *The King of France visited the exhibition, The head of the school came to see me, The glass has fallen on the floor* is clearly not affected by whether or not the hearer is in fact able to identify the particular objects referred to in any speaker's utterance of the sentences" (pp.110–11). Therefore this type of speaker-hearer interaction "is not merely not an entailment relation but is arguably not even a semantic relation" (p. 111).

It may be that the *hearer's* ability to identify the referent should not be accounted for in semantics. But if one wants to assess the truth value of any of the three statements, there is just no way to leave the *speaker's* intended reference out of account — assuming, as Kempson does, that the definite NPs in them are non-anaphoric. Or putting it more simply: one just cannot formulate the truth conditions of, e.g., *The glass has fallen on the floor* unless one knows what glass and what floor the speaker *means.* And yet Kempson has stated unequivocally that "speaker relative concepts must be excluded by fiat" (p. 79). However, this exclusion now turns out to be impracticable even in a semantics as highly artificial as that which Kempson is trying to establish.

The only way to avoid this dilemma is to claim, as Kempson in fact does, that "the non-anaphoric *the* is non-distinct in its semantic representation from the indefinite article" (p. 111). But this is clearly absurd. "Semantic representation", in Kempson's parlance, can be formulated exclusively in terms of truth conditions. However, if the truth conditions of, e.g., *The window has broken* are the same as those of *A window has broken,* then we are compelled to say that any utterance of *The window has broken* is a true statement if any window anywhere in the entire world has broken. Clearly such an analysis has lost every connexion with the intuitive meaning of utterances of *The window has broken.* Kempson's "semantics of natural language" has been arbitrarily defined not on the basis of the phenomena we know from natural language, but on the basis of the phenomena accessible to the artificial language with which she has chosen to describe natural language.

8. PR attached to the VP

Beginning with verbs proper, there seems to be general agreement that the following types have PR attached to them:

1) verbs of transition. Consider the sentences:

(18) *Roderick awoke*

(19) *Honoria fell asleep*

All the operational criteria work excellently with examples such as these, showing that it is a PR for any occurrence of *awake* that the subject is asleep, whereas in any occurrence of *fall asleep* it is a PR that the subject is awake.

These and other types of 'verbal' or 'predicative' PR are discussed in Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970). Interest is mainly centered round the status of complements to the so-called

2) 'factive' predicates, such as:

(20) { *He regrets* / *It is terrifying* / *It makes sense* / *It bothers them* / *They are amused* } *that the President has played so much football*

Some of these predicates present noteworthy features. Consider:

(21) *Honoria realized a long time ago that Roderick is an imbecile*

(22) *It was then that I learned that the butler had done it*

Verbs implying factiveness differ from verbs of transition in that they can in certain cases be replaced with other VPs which are synonymous except for the

PR; thus *realize, learn,* and *know* may be replaced with *adopt the view, hear* and *be convinced,* respectively.

An interesting aspect of the study of these verbs is the very complex system of distributional restraints they are under. One cannot say

(23) *Honoria has realized that Roderick is a maniac, and I too suspect it*

nor can one say

(24) *Honoria believes Roderick killed the butler, but I realize it*

i.e., one cannot let two modal operators apply to the same proposition, one of which presupposes the factiveness of the proposition, while the other does not. There are other related rules which deserve a discussion of their own. One fact of general interest should be noted, however, namely that for most of these rules counter-examples can be found which involve the verb *know,* e.g.,

(25) *Honoria believes Roderick killed the butler, but I know it*

That is to say, there are cases where the factiveness usually presupposed by *know* acquires propositional force. Similarly, it may well be the factiveness that is attained by a negation of an utterance involving *know,* as in

(26) *I KNOW Roderick killed the cockroach*
No, you don't! You just BELIEVE it

The general fact here brought out is highly interesting: a given device which has a CF and a PR may 'waver' in regard to what is CF and what is presupposed. But that is exceptional. However, if all meaning components of lexical items had the same status, as Kempson claims, then it would follow, among other things, that verbs in the group just discussed would show a distributional behaviour like that of *know* – and we have just seen that they do not.

3) Verbs of judgment. This category, discussed extensively in Fillmore (1971b), also answers to the operational tests. Consider the sentences:

(27) *Roderick accused the butler of killing the cockroach but the man managed to exonerate himself*

(28) *The board of the club criticized Roderick for killing the butler*

Clearly, the PR attached to *accuse* is that the act which the accuser states to have been committed by the accused is a reprehensible one. Conversely, the PR attached to *criticize* is that the act which the critic reproaches the person criticized for having committed, was in fact committed by him. Likewise, in *exonerate,* it is again a PR that the act which the exonerator proves the defendant not to have committed is reprehensible.

But in verbs such as these which describe verbal acts, either illocutionary or perlocutionary, there is a question as to *who* it is that holds the PR: is it the accuser, respectively the critic, or is it the speaker of the utterance? If I say *The Humane Society gave Honoria the credit for killing Roderick,* is it me, or is it

the Humane Society, that holds the PR that Roderick was a reprehensible character? Or is it both? While in the two preceding categories of verbs there was no occasion for doubt in this respect, we probably have to conclude that in verbs of judgment, if the 'judge' and the speaker of the utterance are not the same, we may have 'deviant', ambiguous cases, although the normal case is that it is both the judge and the speaker.

4) Adverbials. Consider (29):

(29) *Yesterday Roderick was drunk again*

It is intuitively obvious that words like *again,* and likewise *still, also,* and *any more,* etc., have as their sole function that of introducing a PR on the background of which the CF of the sentence is to be seen. In (29), it is presupposed that Roderick has been drunk before, and stated that he was so yesterday. We have here the clearest possible instance of the separability of CF and PR, in that the PR is represented by one separate morpheme which has no other function.

This being so, the question of the function of PR-bearing elements in natural language acquires a certain urgency. We shall briefly anticipate an answer which will be discussed somewhat more fully in the following section. We think the study of PR-bearing adverbials bears out the assumption that the function of the PR-bearing element in general is to help the hearer to understand in what way the utterance in which it occurs is relevant for him. For example, in (29) the fact that Roderick has evinced certain deplorable features of character continuously *up until* now may be the reason why the hearer is concerned about him, and thus the reason why it is relevant for the hearer to learn that Roderick has these features of character at the present moment.

This leads us to a related group of adverbials, on which pioneering work has been done by Ducrot (1973 b). The group includes, notably, words such as *even, hardly, almost, barely* and others. They also serve to help the hearer to understand how the utterance in which they occur is relevant for him, but they do so in a very specific manner. We shall attempt to show that to account for certain invariant meaning components of these words, one will have to invoke a notion we shall call (following Ducrot 1973 b) the *argumentative orientation* of the words in question.

We shall say that an element has an argumentative orientation if it can be shown that utterances in which it occurs invariably serve as antecedents of a continuation with a certain 'tendency'. The criterion may be, e.g., that an utterance containing a given element E is always a stronger argument for a given potential conclusion C than the same utterance *without* E. Or, for a given other element, the opposite may be shown to be the case. Thus, the element *almost* only belongs in statements supporting conclusions that would receive even greater support from

the same statement without *almost: Roderick kissed Honoria* is always a stronger argument than *Roderick almost kissed Honoria,* no matter whether one wants to argue that Roderick is a gentleman or that he is a lout.

Our case against the adequacy of a truth-conditional account of such adverbials consists of two complementary arguments. 1) There are adverbials that are bafflingly *ambiguous* with respect to truth-conditional meaning, but which can be shown to be *unambiguous* with respect to argumentative orientation; 2) there are pairs of adverbials which have the *same* truth-conditional meaning, but *opposite* argumentative orientations. If these two claims hold, then argumentative orientation is an indispensable type of lexical (semantic) information along with truth-conditions.

Ad (1). Consider the adverbial *barely,* as for example in

(30) *Roderick barely kissed Honoria*

In terms of truth conditions, *barely* is strangely ambiguous. The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* lists as one of its extant meanings "Only just; *hence,* not quite . . .". According to this description, *barely* entails, in (30), either that Roderick kissed Honoria, or that he did *not* kiss her – we do not know which. The serious consequences of this confusion would be even more obvious, e.g., in a criminal case where Roderick was charged with rape, and where a witness made the statement *Roderick barely raped Honoria.*

However, the notion of argumentative orientation explains the essential lexical feature of this puzzling word. Whether or not (30) entails that Roderick did in fact kiss Honoria, it is in any case clear that (30) is always argumentatively stronger than *Roderick kissed Honoria* (i.e., argumentatively *barely* is the converse of *almost).* No matter whether one wants to argue that Roderick is shy, or that he is indifferent to Honoria, (30) would be a clearer and weightier argument than *Roderick kissed Honoria.* Note also that *Roderick almost kissed Honoria* would be quite out of place in both cases – in spite of the fact that its truth-conditional meaning is identical with one of the truth-conditional meanings of *barely* ("not quite").

Ad (2). Consider the pair of adverbials *little* and *a little,* as in

(31 a) *Roderick is little worried about his bad breath*

(31 b) *Roderick is a little worried about his bad breath*

Obviously, it would be otiose to seek a difference in truth conditions here, as that would require some quantitative measurement of the extent of Roderick's worry. Instead, we will point to the difference in argumentative orientation. Consider the potential continuation *Therefore he will have no qualms about kissing Honoria.* This would be impossible as a continuation of (31 b), but eminently suitable as a continuation of (31 a). The converse would be the case with *Therefore he will probably go to a dentist.* Note also that if one wanted an even

stronger argument for *Therefore he will have no qualms* than (31 a), it might be something like *Roderick is not at all worried about his bad breath;* on the other hand, if one wanted a stronger argument than (31 b) for *Therefore he will probably go to a dentist,* it would have to be something like *Roderick is acutely worried about his bad breath.*

We think it obvious that the lexical features pointed out in the cases (1) and (2) must be expressed in terms of PR, as they demonstrably cannot be expressed in terms of entailment (i.e.,truth conditions). We might then say that *barely* presupposes a linguistic context the drift of which is a 'negative' conclusion (whereas *almost* presupposes a context involving a 'positive' conclusion). Similarly, it is a PR of the adverbial *little* that it helps to support a conclusion which is negative, whereas it is a PR of *a little* that it supports a conclusion which is positive. This is accordance with the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,* which has, for *little,* "Not much; barely any", and for *a little* "a small quantity of; some, though not much".

Are these claims (which are wholly dependent on Ducrot's analyses, cfr. 1972, chap. 7 and pp. 254–65, and 1973b, chap. 13) in keeping with our definition of PR as those conditions which must hold if the CF of the utterance is to come off? Consider the claim that *Roderick almost kissed Honoria* would be out of place as part of an argument for Roderick's shyness. This is tantamount to saying that whoever used this sentence as part of an alleged case for Roderick's shyness would be defeating his own purpose and evoking nothing but confusion. Or in other words, his CF would *not* come off; and the requirement that *almost* cannot be used in arguing such a case therefore answers to our definition of PR.

A final remark. It might be held against these analyses that the cases of PR we claim to have pointed out are not 'linguistic' PR, but merely 'anthropological' ones. For example, *Roderick almost kissed Honoria* might easily be an argument for Roderick's shyness in a culture where, e.g., kissing is seen as a sign of shyness and blushing as a sign of dauntless nerve. But this does not refute our analysis. Although the conclusion is now the opposite of what is was before, it still holds that the argument would be stronger without *almost.* Let us recall that utterances, as G. Lakoff shows (1971, pp. 336–7), are often not well-formed or ill-formed *per se,* but only relative to a set of PR. Therefore our analysis might be reformulated to the effect that *Roderick almost kissed Honoria. Therefore he must be very shy* is only well-formed relative to the (very esoteric) PR that kissing is a sign of shyness.

Our discussion of PR-carrying adverbials does not pretend to be at all exhaustive, and the same obviously holds true for the entire list of types of PR. We merely hope to have substantiated the claim that PR penetrale all levels of natural

language. However, we would like to discuss one more case, namely that of the adverbial *even.* This is interesting as a challenge, because R. Kempson expressly leaves the question open of how to account for this item: its meaning cannot be predicted within a truth-conditional framework, but neither can it be derived from the Gricean conversational maxims.

We think that a functional approach will once again supply the solution. That is to say, *even* should be described in terms of what it indicates about the overall function of the utterance in which it occurs. J.C. Anscombre (1973) has made an illuminating study of *même,* the French counterpart to *even. Même,* he maintains, carries no less than three PR. Like the other adverbials we have discussed, *même,* and similarly *even,* should be understood in relation to a potential *conclusion* for which the utterance in which it occurs should be seen as an argument. If we have

(32) *Even Roderick can read and write*

the truth-conditional account predicts that the sentence is synonymous to *Roderick can read and write.* But (32), in addition, has the following PR:

1) (32) is an argument for some conclusion C;
2) there are a number of other arguments A_1, A_2, . . . A_i for C which differ from (32) only with regard to the constituent that *even* modifies (i.e., *Roderick);*
3) (32) is a stronger argument for C than A_1, A_2, . . . , A_i.

In other words it is a PR of the statement *even p* that it is presented as the strongest of a set of arguments for some conclusion; for example, if we argue *Even Roderick can read and write. Therefore the English school system must be outstanding,* it is presupposed a) that Roderick is seen in relation to a set of other people who can read and write; b) that Roderick's literacy is a stronger argument for the excellence of the English school system than the literacy of all these other people — from which follows c) Roderick must have been less likely to learn to read and write than these others, for example because his intelligence is lower than theirs.

This analysis of *even* goes to show, once again, that in order to account for certain invariant features of lexical items one must go beyond a purely truth-conditional analysis and recognize how the items in question help to define the argumentative *function* of the sentence in which they occur. The concept that will furnish such an understanding is that of PR; that is to say, a sentence comprising *even* raises certain conditions to be fulfilled by any linguistic context in which it is to occur. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the result will be that, whatever its nature, the CF of the total utterance will fail to come off.

III. TOWARDS A NEW OPERATIONAL CRITERION OF PR

A possible reason for being reluctant to adopt a functional theory of PR is that there seems to be no workable operational test, once the truth-valuelessness criterion and the negation test are relinquished. However, things are not quite as bad as that. We shall provisionally discuss another conceivable kind of operational test, based on certain observations by Ducrot (1972, pp. 81 ff). We have claimed that PR mark the point of departure as opposed to the point of interest of the utterance, and if there were cases where this distinction were reflected in rules for the use of linguistic elements, that might provide us with a criterion of PR. The following discussion takes a step in this direction, but admittedly it concerns itself only with statements or chains of statements. (However, the intuitive value of the negation criterion seems, in any case, to be virtually lost in those attempts that have been made to extend it to utterances other than statements; cfr., e.g., Keenan and Hull 1973.)

In order to single out the PR of a sentence among the components of its meaning, Ducrot formulates the 'loi d'enchaînement', which says, in effect: when one uses the sentence as a link in a chain of reasoning, for example by appending to it a conclusion beginning with *Therefore,* then this conclusion cannot base itself on the PR of the sentence. If this is attempted, then the resulting chain of reasoning will appear odd or even invalid. For example, if one has *John has stopped beating his wife,* then the assumption *John once beat his wife* is a PR (and not an entailment, as Kempson would have it, cfr. Kempson 1975, pp. 77–8), for we can only have *John has stopped beating his wife. Therefore they are getting on better now,* but not **John has stopped beating his wife. Therefore he is a brute,* where the conclusion is based on the PR. (This utterance, it might be objected, *could* be well-formed – but only if the point of interest of the first sentence could be taken to support the conclusion, i.e., if it were brutish for John not to beat his wife now. This is tantamount to saying, as G. Lakoff does (1971, pp. 336–7), that utterances need not be well-formed or ill-formed *per see,* but may be so only relative to a set of PR.)

We do not mean to offer any one test which will capture all cases of PR. However, we think it is worthwhile to continue along the lines suggested by Ducrot's 'loi d'enchaînement' in the search for a new operational criterion of PR. The following reasons, we believe, make this claim plausible. First, if we are right in assuming that syntagms beyond the sentence level also may carry PR, then it seems obvious that an operational test should be applicable to such syntagms as well as to shorter ones. This is not the case with negation, whereas a syntagm of almost any length can be incorporated into a chain of reasoning of some kind. Furthermore, the concept 'chain of reasoning' is closely related to the notion of the overall point or function of an utterance, on which we based our initial de-

finition of PR (cfr. p. 13). A typical way of endowing a string of sentences with an overall point is to chain them together argumentatively. And the typical way to do this is to let each sentence take as point of departure the point of interest of the preceding sentence, while providing a point of interest that the next sentence, in turn, takes as its point of departure. Finally, 'chain of reasoning' also seems a more natural basis for an operational test than negation, insofar as the establishment of such a chain is an operation undertaken by the speaker himself, whereas negation typically is an operation undertaken by the hearer. A hearer may, if he is polemically inclined, find a way to negate any meaning component of the speaker's utterance (which essentially is Kempson's one and only argument against the negation test). Therefore, speaker-behaviour must on the whole be more reliable than hearer-behaviour in testing what meaning components have PR status.

We might also add that Ducrot, himself a believer in the negation test, shows a kind of 'enchaînement' test to be more reliable in cases analogous to those discussed in our section on adverbials with argumentative orientation (p. 29). In the case of *barely*, for example, the negation test is not applicable – which can intuitively be related to the fact that this word and its correlates already belong to the same semantic zone as negation.

There is, however, another operation which will help to understand the presuppositional meaning of *barely*. Consider the two sentences *This essay is barely good enough, is it?* and *He barely reached the station in time, didn't he?* Clearly, it is only the 'tags' *is it* and *didn't he* that dissolve the ambiguity as to whether the essay *is* good enough (it is not) or whether he did reach the station (he did). Thus we see that *barely* can be used to negate as well as to assert; but it is also clear that whether it is used one way or the other, *barely* presupposes a continuation for which *hardly* or *not at all* would form an even stronger antecedent.

In conclusion, we think it is a task for further investigation to set up a workable operational test of PR based on the 'chain of reasoning' idea – and not only that: an important task for further research is to investigate the rôle played by PR in the constitution of *texts*, i.e., such chains of sentences that have a clear overall point.

IV. PRESUPPOSITIONS: FURTHER ANALYSIS

1. The basic structure of PR.

The preceding account has had a certain defensive orientation against those who, like R. Kempson, think that PR do not belong in semantics. However, there is

also a divergence between our account and that of other theorists of PR, including O. Ducrot, with whom we have gone along on a number of points. It is not common to include such a wide variety of phenomena as we have done under the heading of PR. In particular, it is normal to distinguish between conventional, invariant PR, e.g., those attached to definite NPs, factive verbs or verbs of transition, on the one hand, and on the other hand conversational implicatures, which are occasion-specific. However, instead of emphasizing this difference we have chosen to concentrate on an important similarity – namely that obtaining between conventional PR on the one hand and, on the other, those *maxims* (in Ducrot's terminology 'lois de discours') that give rise to implicatures. These two types of phenomena – conventional PR and conversational maxims – are really just the two extremes on a continuous scale of phenomena, all of which have the same basic dual structure: there is a) an invariant element, i.e.,a *condition* which must be satisfied, if the use of the element in question is to be felicitous; and there is b) the occasion-specific *way* in which this condition is satisfied in a given case.

At one extreme of this continuum we have conditions of a very specific nature, attached to single semantic features, and at the other end conditions of a highly general and abstract nature, attaching to utterances as such. Between the very specific and the very general conditions we have several intermediary stages. For example, the condition attaching to definite NP's, namely that it should be possible for the hearer to identify their referent, is similar to the conditions attaching to utterances – those of non-redundancy and relevance – in that the hearer must usually do something himself to work out how the utterance is meant to fulfil the conditions in question. Less general is the condition attaching to a conjunction like *but;* but even here, it is up to the hearer to work out just *how* the PR attaching to *but* is fulfilled. For example, in *Fred is Republican, but honest,* the PR may be fulfilled in a number of specific ways, of which we will only mention the two most inviting: a) it's bad that he's Republican, but as he is honest, he's still OK; and b) it's nice that he's Republican, only it's too bad that he's honest, since what we really need is a crooked Republican. Even very specific conditions, such as those attaching to verbs of transition, may be fulfilled in a number of occasion-specific ways. As for verbs of transition, they may be paraphrased in in the form 'change to state X'. The general form of the PR attached to such verbs may accordingly be said to be 'non-obtainment of state X up to the relevant point of time'. In what way this condition is fulfilled, however, cannot in principle be predicted in each individual case, although the speaker may of course explicate it, if he does not assume that the hearer can work it out. Similarly with factive predicates: the verb *mind* has the general PR that the thing one minds is a fact, whether it is specified as in *I don't mind his bad manners* or left unspecified as in *I don't mind.*

In conclusion, there seems to be a structural isomorphism between conversational maxims and conditions attaching to individual morphemes such that both these phenomena, and everything in between, may be rolled together under the heading of PR. Therefore it is not really to the point to emphasize the differences between conventional PR and implicatures *derived* from conversational maxims, as do Ducrot (1969, 1972) and Kempson (who, at the same time, denies the existence of conventional PR). Maxims are also PR, and PR are also maxims, and they are all conditions.

2. PR: conditions and meaning components

So far, we have been talking about PR as conditions which must be fulfilled by the situation if the CF of the utterance is to come off. However, from the hearer's point of view it does not make sense to construe the PR of an utterance as *conditions*. As he is not responsible for the utterance, he is not in a position to either fulfil or violate any conditions that it may be under. This does not mean that it is only from the speaker's point of view that PR are relevant. The hearer cannot fulfil or violate conditions, but since he is a competent speaker of the language, he is, of course, *aware* of them. In other words, from the hearer's point of view the PR are part of the *content* that the speaker transmits to him through the utterance. When we hear of somebody being *charged* with *x* we understand that *x* is considered an offense; if Smith *stops* smoking, he must have been a smoker; when we hear that somebody is *out of* jail right now, we understand (according to the non-redundancy rule) that he was once *in;* if somebody is asked *To what are we indebted for the honour of this visit?* we understand that he is far from being considered an intimate friend of the family, etc.

From now on we shall consider PR only from the hearer's angle, as part of the content. It is worth observing, however, that there is no conflict between the two points of view: PR are content elements precisely because they are conditions. To discuss what they *essentially* are will probably not be fruitful, since it is difficult to conceive of a PR as being one of these things without being the other (cfr. Ducrot 1972, pp. 26 ff).

The question now arises: if PR are part of the content, what is their relation to the other parts of the content? Since we have defined PR as conditions which the BA must satisfy if the CF if to come about, it would be natural to say that PR were that part of the content of an utterance which overlapped with the BA. This, however, would be true only in the spotlessly ideal communication which we have assumed until now. In this ideal case, where the speaker conscientiously makes sure that all the PR do in fact belong to the actual BA, the

hearer will not have to devote much attention to the PR as content, since he will be familiar with them all beforehand. But the less firmly a PR is rooted in the hearer's BA, the more important will it be to him as part of the content in the actual communication.

3. Why are there PR in natural languages?

The above observation leads us to a hypothesis concerning the reason why PR are so frequent in natural languages, as opposed to their absence in formalized languages. One of the principal goals of logical positivism was to construct a scientific metalanguage that admitted of no subjective interpretations, i.e.,in which every sentence would mean one and only one thing regardless of *who* interpreted it and *when*. Only if the scientific language fulfilled this criterion did the knowledge expressed in it qualify as objective. In the world of human events, however, things are very far from being the same when they occur in different contexts. Consider the following examples. A man who does not smoke on July 15 nor on any subsequent day will be described in the same manner by a scientific metalanguage no matter whether he has never smoked before or whether he has in fact been a smoker up to that day. But in a natural language, we will want to say that he has *stopped* smoking. Or again, if we want to assert a fact, we may say either, e.g.,

(33) *The farmer killed the duckling*

or

(34) *It was the farmer who killed the duckling*

– the information we give is the same, but in (34) the PR reveals that the information is *situated* in a certain way, viz. that it is known that the duckling had been killed, but not who did it. Here we see that at the same time as (34) specifies the context in which the state of affairs is seen, it also makes it clearer to the hearer *what kind of interest* this state of affairs has for him.

And this holds for most types of PR: by situating itself in certain distinct ways, an utterance at the same time makes clear what kind and degree of interest it has to the hearer. This is due to the simple fact that the same state of affairs may have greatly varying kinds and degrees of interest according to different contexts, i.e.,different sets of BA. Therefore, it is only natural that there should exist different descriptions of the same states of affairs, according to the different sets of BA in which they may occur. This we have in fact seen very clearly exemplified in the discussion of conjunction and adverbials, where it turned out that two utterances may describe precisely the same state of affairs and yet differ semantically with regard to their argumentative purpose or 'orientation'.

This leads us to suggest that the purpose of PR-carrying devices in natural languages is to append information about the context or background against which the utterance should be seen – *in order that* the kind and degree of its interest may be specified for the hearer; i.e., PR are there not just to create cumbersome conditions for the coming about of the CF (as our definition of PR might suggest), but also to help the hearer see exactly what the CF is. Thus, if natural languages did not have PR-carrying devices, it would be much harder for a speaker to make himself clear. PR are not obstacles to communication, but vehicles for it.

One conceivable way of doing without PR would be to state explicitly all those things that are usually conveyed by means of PR-carrying devices. However, this way of talking would differ enormously from what we know as everyday linguistic interaction. The difference between saying things explicitly and implicitly (i.e., by means of PR) has been discussed by R. Lakoff (1972). A case in point is the category of honorifics as it occurs in, e.g., Japanese, where the choice between polite and informal speech is reflected in the choice of different lexical forms, particles etc. In our terms the honorific forms would be part of a code carrying the PR 'to be used in polite speech'. These forms have traditionally been translated 'explicitly', resulting in sentences like (35):

(35) *Honorable Mr. Snarf have some of my humble pie* (cfr. op. cit. p. 910)

This, of course, sounds ludicrous – as it also would if translated directly into Japanese. As pointed out by Robin Lakoff, an appropriate translation into English would have to be one in which the politeness, the respectful attitude, is conveyed by implicit means, i.e., by means of a PR. As she also points out, a phenomenon similar to honorific speech occurs when a hostess says (36):

(36) *You must have some of this cake*

(36), in its literal sense, states that a certain necessity exists, viz. that the guests have to eat some of the cake in question. According to the rule of non-redundancy, this conveys the *implicature* that the inherent qualities of the cake are not enough to make the guests aware of this necessity. Conversely, if the hostess had said

(37) *You may have some of this cake*

she would have issued a permission, which is only relevant if the guests feel the urge to eat the cake and only need the permission to begin. Thus in (36), the hostess is really making a gesture of deprecation similar to that which occurs in honorific speech.

PART TWO

The Theory of Presupposition Failure

V. A CLOSER LOOK AT BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS

Above we have referred to the BA as if they were a more or less undifferentiated body of assumptions that subsist 'as such' in the situation; and this is indeed the usual way of understanding the concept. In this framework, BA means what the interlocutors would ordinarily take for granted, everything that is obvious to them because of sociocultural setting and individual background.

But when such assumptions are used in communication, this description is no longer adequate. It is modelled on the relationship between *one* individual and his 'world'. Communication involves at least *two* individuals, however, and the function of the BA in communication, as we have seen, is to supply the hearer with that information which is necessary to fully understand the CF. Therefore, it is not enough that the speaker and the hearer each have their respective BA. The determination by a speaker of what qualifies as BA in an act of communication crucially involves an estimate of what is BA *to the hearer.* A speaker is *not* free to say a thing like *But I'm not accusing you of being a Republican,* even if *he* recognizes the PR that Republicanism is a bad thing. The crucial point is that the hearer has to recognize it as well if the utterance is to be a felicitous act of communication (as to what happens when the hearer does not recognize this PR, see the sections on 'non-solidarity' and 'bullying' below). This again means that the speaker in making an utterance like the one just cited has to assume that the PR belongs to the BA of the hearer as well as to his own.

Our conclusion at this point must be that the statement that 'a given PR belongs to the BA' describes a state of affairs which is more complex than usually assumed. First, it is imperative that the PR should belong to the BA of both interlocutors, but further, it seems necessary that there must be some process of *mutual estimation* involved between the speaker and hearer concerning the status of the PR. A related problem has been treated in the philosophy of speech acts (cfr. Searle's discussion of Grice's theory in Searle 1971). Also, Strawson (1971) makes it clear that the meaning of an utterance can only be described if account is taken of the *communication-intention* of the speaker.

But if this is true from the point of view of the philosopher of language, it should be true *a fortiori* from the point of view of *the hearer* of the utterance. For a hearer to interpret the meaning of a speaker's utterance is to make an assumption about what the speaker intends with it.

The argument does not stop here, however. Not only must H make an assumption about what S intends to do in performing his utterance, S himself must also assume that H will make this assumption, and make it correctly. Intending to do something by one's utterance, e.g., greeting or promising, and not intending the hearer to *know* that one intends it is a contradiction.

We are speaking here of the CF of the utterance, and we see that to describe any normal case of a CF that comes off one must take account not only of S's intention, but also of H's assumption about it and of S's assumption about that assumption.

This complexity, inherent in the apparently simple notion that S 'means' to carry out some illocutionary act, has been pointed out by others, e.g., Searle. If S wants to produce a given illocutionary effect IE, e.g.,greeting H, the following requirement holds: "Not only must *S* intend to produce *IE* by virtue of *H*'s knowing the meaning of the sentence, but he must also intend that *H* recognize the utterance of the sentence as one produced with the intention of producing *IE.*" (Searle 1969, p. 48, footnote.)

The starting point in this series of replicative assumptions is something which is in S's mind, and we are only interested in H insofar as he is making assumptions about that. However, if instead of speaking about the CF we look at the PR of an utterance, the case is different. PR, we have said, are conditions which must be fulfilled for the CF of the utterance to come off. Moreover, we have said that they should be fulfilled not by the 'world' in some general or objective sense, but by the BA.

Finally and most importantly, we have seen that a condition presupposed by an utterance must hold not just in the BA of S or in the BA of H, *but in the BA of both parties.* If either party fails to recognize among his BA the condition which is presupposed, then the CF cannot come about. If H fails to recognize as a fact that *someone* has eaten a cockroach, then the CF of the cleft sentence:

(38) *It was Roderick who ate the cockroach*

which is to assert the identity of the doer, cannot come off. Conversely, if S himself does not recognize the fact, then he cannot intend that which appears to be the CF of the utterance, and even if H does recognize the fact and assumes that S intends the apparent CF, he will be mistaken, which again means he is mistaken if he thinks the CF comes off.

In a similar vein, Cicourel (1968) speaks of the "reciprocity of perspectives": his formulation requires S, when speaking to H, to choose the code that H would

have chosen in his place. In our terms, this would be equivalent to saying that S must choose a code the *appropriateness* of which belongs to the BA not only of himself, but also of H. And that is a case of the general rule which we have just postulated, namely that PR only hold if they belong to the BA of both S and H. We might say that the 'norm' for the use of PR is that S has to be aware that when he introduces a PR, he is doing so not just on his own behalf, but on behalf of both himself and H.

We can now see that as far as the PR of the utterance are concerned, there are precisely twice as many factors to be taken into account in the description of the speech event as was the case with the CF. Not only is it important to know whether the PR is part of S's BA, and whether H assumes this, and whether S in his turn assumes that H assumes it; it is equally decisive whether it belongs to the BA of H. And on a similar line of argument we can show that we also have to know whether S assumes that the PR belongs to the BA of H, and whether H in his turn assumes this.[1])

That these two series of replicative assumptions both enter into the picture in the account of the shared background knowledge of S and H is a fact copiously discussed by S.R. Schiffer, who coins the expression 'mutual knowledge' (marking the noun with an asterisk). Let $K_S p$ mean that S knows that p, and let A be the hearer ('audience'); then S and A 'mutually know' p just in case that $K_S p, K_A p, K_S K_A p, K_A K_S p, K_S K_A K_S p, K_A K_S K_A p, K_S K_A K_S K_A p, K_A K_S K_A K_S p \ldots$ (Schiffer 1972, pp. 30–31). What we have here is in effect our two series of replicative assumptions, one concerning S's immediate assumption that p, the other concerning H's immediate assumption that p; only the two series are interwoven in Schiffer's account.

Kempson uses the term 'the Pragmatic Universe of Discourse' for Schiffer's 'mutual knowledge' (Kempson 1975, pp. 167 ff). However, it is doubtful whether she has grasped the full complexity of the problem, as she only mentions the assumptions S is making (corresponding to the first, the third, the fifth and the seventh in Schiffer's list). She seems to think that as far as the rest are concerned, they only enter into the picture if H takes part in the conversational exchange *as a speaker;* but if we want to describe speech events involving PR in full, it is

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1) The following verse, quoted to us by Henry Widdowson, conveys perhaps better than many a formalism the decisive rôle that the process of mutual estimation between speaker and hearer plays in determining the nature of speech events:

'O go to Father,' she said.
Now she knew that I knew that her father was dead.
And she knew that I knew what a life he had led.
So she knew that I knew what she meant when she said,
'Go to Father.'

all-important that they be taken into account even when H remains the passive hearer.

One might ask whether the two series of replicative assumptions might not go even further, or whether there is a logical limit to them anywhere. Logically, it seems that they might in fact go on indefinitely; for example, when we say that not only should S intend a given CF with his utterance, but he should also intend H to understand that he intends it, could we not say that H has to understand *this* latter fact as well? At least it seems obvious that if H thinks S does *not* intend him to think that he intends the CF, then the CF does not come about; H in such a case would have the impression that S was being ironical or otherwise non-serious.

Schiffer, too, is aware that the regress may go on forever; but he considers it a "perfectly harmless" and "general" one, which will obtain "whenever *S* and *A* know that *p*, know that each other knows that *p*, and all the relevant facts are 'out in the open'."

A way of stating this would be to say that communication involves a "coordination problem", since no successful communicative act can be intended without taking the hearer's reaction into account. Coordination problems have been described in Lewis (1969), and he makes it very clear that in principle there is no limit to the number of replicative assumptions that are involved in making decisions in such matters. However, he too argues that such an infinite regress is harmless, not vicious, since coordination problems are crucially involved in *any* kind of convention, even the simplest.

VI. BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS AND PRESUPPOSITION FAILURE

In the diagram below (fig. 1), which illustrates the two series of replicative assumptions concerning PR, we have chosen – arbitrarily – to include four levels in each series (henceforth 'column'). The left hand column has on top the marker *S*, which is where we shall indicate whether the PR in question belongs to the BA of the speaker. Below *S* comes the marker *HS*, where we shall indicate whether H assumes that S recognizes the PR; below that we have *SHS*, which designates S's assumption about this latter assumption, and at bottom we have *HSHS*, which designates H's assumption about the assumption designated by *SHS*.

In the right hand column, we start with the marker *H*, which tells us whether the PR belongs to the BA of H. Then comes *SH*, which designates S's assumption as to whether the PR belongs to the BA of H. Then comes *HSH*, designating H's assumption about *SH;* and finally, *SHSH*, which designates S's assumption about *HSH*. Thus we have:

PR:

S	H
HS	SH
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Fig. 1

The next question is how to fill out this diagram. We shall first discuss what may be called the *standard situation.* Speaking in logical terms, we might say that each of the markers *S* and *H* designates the logical subject of a proposition, and by ascribing a value (which may be either + or –) to these subjects we get propositions. For example, *S +* will mean *the PR which the speaker is making belongs to his BA,* while *H –* will mean *the PR which the speaker is making does not belong to the hearer's BA.* Each of the markers on the lower levels should then be construed as a proposition with a modal operator superimposed on it. The modal operator in each case is *assume.* Thus if we have *HS +* it means *H assumes: S +*, and if we have *SH –* it means *S assumes: H –.* That is to say, we do not need the negated form of the modal operator *assume;* only the propositions onto which the operator is superimposed can have the two values + and –. Therefore if we have, for example, *HSH –*, it means one and only one thing, namely *H assumes: SH –;* and we have already seen that *SH –* means one and only one thing. The meaning of *SH –* is now a proposition onto which the invariant modal operator *assume* is superimposed. Thus each marker will have one and only one algebraic sign attached to it, and each combination of marker and algebraic sign will have one and only one meaning.

We shall now define the *standard situation* for the occurrence of PR as that which is illustrated by the following diagram:

PR:

S +	H +
HS +	SH +
SHS +	HSH +
HSHS +	SHSH +

Fig. 2

It is now our contention that all the markers *S, H, HS, SH* etc. illustrate mental states of affairs in S and H which are decisive for the nature of the speech event that occurs. But as a given value (+ or –) of any of these markers illustrates one and only one mental state of affairs in either S or H, the diagram may be

filled out in any conceivable way with pluses and minuses, and no matter how we fill it out it will illustrate one and only one conceivable and distintive type of speech event.

Our diagram has eight variables, all binary, which means that it can be filled out in $2^8 = 256$ different ways, representing 256 different types of speech events. Only one of these is 'unmarked', namely the 'standard situation', as illustrated by the diagram shown above. An example of such a speech event is a happily executed greeting, in which all the eight markers must have the value +. If any marker has the value –, a different and distinctive speech event comes about.

We will now define the concept of *presupposition failure* (henceforth PF) as the occurrence of a PR for which any of the markers in the diagram has the value –. In other words the different variants of our diagram describe 255 types of PF situations.

This high degree of differentiation between PF situation types is the main difference between our account of the concept of PR and current ones. (Cfr. Austin 1962 on 'infelicities' and, conversely, Searle 1969 on 'non-defective' speech acts.) The task now is to prove that the differences illustrated by different variants of the diagram correspond to intuitive differences between speech events.

This we propose to do in the following way. First we shall discuss a set of examples of typical PF situations and show that their characteristics are in each case represented by a specific constellation of + and – values in the corresponding diagram. Then we shall attempt to generalize from the discussion a number of 'distinctive features', i.e.,certain patterns of + and – values that may recur in a variety of diagrams. The corresponding situation types will then be seen to be related precisely because they have this pattern in common. The distinctive features we shall discuss will be *sincerity* and *insincerity*, *mistakes* and *'one-up-ness'*, *communicative balance*, *solidarity* and *non-solidarity*, *rhetorical behaviour*, *bullying*, *deception*, *suspicion* and *achieved communication*. The consideration of these features should substantiate the claim that a change in the value of any one marker in the diagram is likely to produce a situation type which is sensibly different. Finally, we shall construct a diagram which is apparently as esoteric as possible and then show that every feature in it is instrumental in defining a type of PF situation which is existent and distinctive. In connexion with this discussion, two further concepts will emerge to be added to the list above, namely *perfidy* and *manipulation*.

Some of these concepts will naturally require further discussion and exemplification than will be possible here. And doubtless, further concepts can be developed which will serve, like these, to describe the manifold rôles played by PR in actual speech events.

Before going on to the discussion of sample situations, however, we shall demonstrate the general principles for the interpretation of diagrams. Let us assume that instead of having the value + for every marker, we have one –. For simplicity's sake, let it be a - for the marker *H*. All other markers remain +. We then have

PR:

S +	H -
HS +	SH +
SHS +	HSH +
HSHS +	SHSH +

Fig. 3

This represents perhaps the simplest type of PF situation. S is saying something on a PR that does not belong to the BA of H, thus violating the law that PR should belong to the BA of both parties.

Now the first question is: does S commit this violation knowingly, for some reason or other? The answer is no, as can be seen from the marker *SH,* which is +, meaning that *S assumes that the PR belongs to the BA of H.* But S is making a *mistake* here.

Further, H assumes that S makes this mistake, as can be seen from the marker *HSH* which is +, meaning *H assumes that S assumes that the PR belongs to the BA of H.* And in fact H is right in this assumption (henceforth, we shall use for the terms 'correct assumption' and 'knowledge' interchangeably); for the assumption is that the marker *SH* is +, and in fact it is. Finally, there is the marker *SHSH* which is also +. This represents an assumption on the part of S, which, if S were to frame it in his mind, would sound something like "H is aware that I assume him to go along with the PR". Now this thought on the part of S is very natural, as S does not know that H does not recognize the PR in the first place; and furthermore, the thought is correct (it is a knowledge rather than just an assumption), for what S thinks is actually that the marker *HSH* is +, and in fact it is.

These were the markers in the right hand column. In the left hand column, all markers are +. *S* + means that the PR which S is making belongs to his own BA. *HS* + means that H assumes this to be the case (and rightly so, i.e.,he 'knows' it). Putting it differently, H knows that S is 'sincere'. *SHS* + means that S thinks H takes him to be sincere; he 'counts on' H to acknowledge his sincerity. And in this case S's calculation is correct. Finally, there is *HSHS* + which means that H is aware that S counts on him to recognize his sincerity.

VII. A SAMPLE OF PF SITUATIONS

We shall now exemplify the PF situation type just discussed, and a number of others. By a PF situation *type* we understand the class of situations which will be represented by one given variant of the diagram. To exemplify different variants of the diagram, we shall draw a series of examples from a set of mutually related situations, namely situations in which *S refers to an absent person by means of linguistic forms that presuppose a more intimate relationship to this person than H in fact has.* In so far as the third person in question is one of fame or eminence, there is a good chance that all these related situations would be grouped together by an observer as instances of *name-dropping.* However, within this larger category differentiation is both possible and called for; and different types of 'name-dropping' situations can in fact be singled out by means of different variants of our diagram.

Let us take, as the recurrent example, a situation where S refers to a person of fame or eminence – say, Dr. Henry Kissinger – by means of a form presupposing a more or less intimate relationship – say, *Henry.* This is a choice-of-code problem; and in choice-of-code matters we know that the PR is that the expression chosen for a given content is *appropriate* to the situation in which the utterance occurs. We may assume that the appropriateness of first names in reference to third persons is determined by some of the same factors that determine the addressing of second persons. If we follow Ervin-Tripp (1969), *Henry* would then be an appropriate way of referring to Dr. Kissinger only in case of kinship, friendship, or colleagueship between him and S; moreover, if there is only colleagueship, but not kinship or friendship between the two, and if the speaker is of lower rank than Dr. Kissinger, the form is only appropriate on the condition that a 'dispensation' of some sort obtains. Now as this is a PR, it is satisfied only if the expression chosen is appropriate not just for S *but also for H.*[2])

The simplest kind of PF comes about when H does not recognize *Henry* as appropriate; for example, he may never have met Dr. Kissinger. But nevertheless S is saying things like

(39) *Well, so I told Henry that . . .*

What do we have here? It may be, firstly:

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2) It could be argued that this rule is on the way out, inasmuch as where social equality obtains between S and H, S may well refer to his friend Dr. Henry Kissinger as *Henry*, regardless of the relation between Dr. Kissinger and H. That is to say, S's behaviour presupposes familiarity between Kissinger and H, *or* social equality between S and H. If therefore S, while speaking to H, refers to Kissinger as *Dr. Kissinger*, H will then understand that S does not take him to be his equal socially – and there again we have an interesting situation.

1) Naïveté on the part of S. We all know of people who are so engrossed in their proceedings with persons of eminence that they refer to them by linguistic forms of intimacy, *not realizing* that by doing this they are using a code not recognized as appropriate by their hearer. Let us now say that H understands that this is so and thinks: "How naïve this character is to forget that we are not all as at home in the highest circles as he". But S just carries on; he does not realize that H thinks this and is thus unwittingly exposing himself to an ironical shrug.

This perfectly ordinary situation belongs to a type represented by fig. 3, above. We will call it *naïveté on the part of S* because he is mistaken about the fulfilment of the basic rule regarding PR, namely that the PR should be recognized by *both* parties. S assumes that a standard situation obtains, whereas in fact it does not. S is not *really* name-dropping; he is just behaving a little mindlessly. Note how different this situation is from

2) intentional, achieved, sincere name-dropping. This too is a classic situation. S speaks of 'Henry', *knowing* that he is using a code not recognized as appropriate by H. But H thinks that S is merely being naïve in the way described above. And S is *counting on* H to think this; but that H does not realize. The idea behind this kind of behaviour on the part of S is, of course, that he wants to *impress* H. By apparently taking for granted that "We are all on intimate terms with Dr. Kissinger" S will naturally appear a bit naïve, but H will probably also think "It must be quite an impressive social circle this character is moving in since he is given to take that sort of thing for granted". We will call this 'intentional' name-dropping, because S is *deliberately* trying to impress H; we will call it 'achieved', as he actually *manages* to do so; but his behaviour is still 'sincere' in the sense that *to S himself* Dr. Kissinger *is* in fact 'Henry'. The diagram now looks as follows:

PR:

S +	S -
HS +	SH -
SHS +	HSH +
HSHS +	SHSH +

Intentional, achieved, sincere ND.

Fig. 4

An analogous situation, where the PR involved is an *ellipsis*, would be the following. Suppose that S and H are two tennis players, and that S is saying to H, in a tone of sincere concern,

(40) *They told me you had a strong backhand. What happened?*

S in fact thinks that H's backhand is useless, and H is aware of this. But H himself is rather proud of his backhand, and this S knows. That is to say, S *knows* that he cannot speak as it were on behalf of both H and himself in making his rather deprecating remark. But H does *not* know that S knows this; he thinks that S is taking his consent for granted with respect to the implicature "Your backhand is no good", derived from the PR of coherence. This, of course, H is likely to find very off-putting. And that may well be S's intention, i.e.,S is trying to discomfit H in order to put him off form (an instance of what Stephen Potter would call 'gamesmanship').

3) Intentional, abortive, sincere ND. S again speaks of Dr. Kissinger as *Henry*. Now, however, the situation is a little more complex, but it is still one that everybody knows first hand. To S, everything is as in (2); that is to say, all markers in the diagram beginning with S (i.e., those which represent S's assumptions) have the same value as in fig. 4. But now H *is aware* that S knows that *Henry* is not appropriate language for H; in other words, H knows that S is trying to impress him. S, then, has been 'seen through'; but this he does not know. And that is why his attempt at impressing H is 'abortive'.

Correspondingly, the only difference in the diagram is that the marker *HSH* now has the value - :

PR:

S +	H -
HS +	SH -
SHS +	HSH -
HSHS +	SHSH +

Intentional, abortive, sincere ND.

Fig. 5

For an analogous situation of the same type, but involving a different kind of PR, let S and H be the two tennis players again. S still thinks H is a useless player, but is aware that H thinks himself quite capable. After a good shot of H's, S exclaims

(41) *That's coming on fine now!*

thus presupposing, in choosing the verb of transition *come on,* that up to this time H did not know how to play tennis. He knows that H does not recognize this *(SH* is -), as in the preceding example. But now we put the case that H is aware of this knowledge on S's part. While in the preceding tennis example, S's remark was likely to sting H considerably because H thought S took his consent

for granted, this time H is aware that S must consider his own remark to be an insult; and for precisely this reason H is not likely to feel hurt, although he will probably feel affronted. S's intention is in fact to hurt, and this intention is not achieved. S has been *seen through* instead.

Note that in both (2) and (3) S knows H does not recognize the PR *(SH -)*, and in neither case does he assume this fact to be known by H *(SHSH +)*; but in (3) it is in fact known by H *(HSH -)*.

4) Intentional, achieved, insincere ND. This situation, as seen from the point of view of H, is identical to (2) (see fig. 4 above); but now there is the further complication that *Henry* is not even appropriate language for S himself, who is just *feigning* to be intimate with Dr. Kissinger. H is thus mistaken at *two* points instead of one: he thinks, erroneously, that S is intimate with Dr. Kissinger, and he thinks, likewise erroneously, that S believes that he (H) is intimate with him too. The diagram looks as follows:

PR:

S -	H -
HS +	SH -
SHS +	HSH +
HSHS +	SHSH +

Intentional, achieved, insincere ND.

Fig. 6

An analogous situation, involving a different type of PR, would be that where S says:

(42) *Why you had to do such a foolish thing is beyond me*

about something H has done which neither S nor H thinks is as foolish as all that. The PR is that the foolishness of H's act is a fact; the idea is to shake H's position and self-esteem.

5) It is now easy to see that a certain (singularly embarrassing) situation which may be called *intentional, abortive, insincere ND* may be described merely by changing the values of *HS* and *HSH* in fig. 6 from + to -. This means that H *sees through* S on the two points where S is 'breaking the rules'; but S does not *know* that he has been seen through (so that he may even try to sustain the hoax for a while) – and this latter fact is symbolized by the values of *SHS* and *SHSH* in fig. 7 which remain +, although *HS* and *HSH* are now -:

PR:

S -	H -
HS -	SH -
SHS +	HSH -
HSHS +	SHSH +

Intentional, abortive, insincere ND.

Fig. 7

In the case of *Why you had to do such a foolish thing is beyond me*, this diagram would apply if H was aware, e.g., that S had been commending his act before H arrived on the scene and saying about H, "Well, of course he is terribly smug about it, too."

6) The situations we have analyzed so far were still fairly simple in the sense that in each case only one of the parties was making wrong assumptions about the other. But what happens if *both go wrong?* That would be the case, for instance, if S were merely being naïve, as described in (1), but was nevertheless *interpreted* by H as behaving the way we discussed in (5), i.e., as practising intentional, abortive, insincere ND. All markers beginning with S would then have the same value as in fig. 3, and all markers beginning with H the same value as in fig. 7, which gives us:

PR:

S +	H -
HS -	SH +
SHS +	HSH -
HSHS +	SHSH +

Fig. 8

It should not be difficult to imagine this situation. It is one whose awkwardness speaks for itself. It can be called *mutual multiple misunderstanding.*

An analogous situation would occur if S, himself an antihomosexual, says

(43) *But I'm not accusing Roderick of homosexuality*

without awareness of any complication, while H thinks: "He does not really think homosexuality is reprehensible, but he wants me to think he does" and: *"I* don't think homosexuality is reprehensible either and he doesn't *think* that I do". H might be a homosexual himself, and believe that S was too, and he might then get the idea that S was parading a feigned attitude in order to distance himself from H in the view of others. That would be a fairly severe thing

to suspect; and so much the worse because S has no idea of what goes on inside H's mind.

VIII. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF DIAGRAMS

One advantage of representing various occurrences of PF in this manner is that it becomes easy to compare PF situations and find the respects in which they are different or similar. On closer inspection, the examples above will show that certain formal features which different variants of the diagram may have in common reflect a strong intuitive similarity between the situation types represented. We will now proceed to define certain general features of diagrams which make possible a quick assessment of the situation types represented, and which describe features that crucially determine the nature of speech events.

1) Sincerity and insincerity. These concepts are basic and simple. When the marker *S* is –, we shall say that S is being 'insincere'; if it is +, we shall say that S is being sincere, no matter what else there might be to say about his behaviour. There is no such thing as insincerity on the part of H. Sincerity and insincerity are shown in fig. 9 a and b.

PR:	
S +	H
HS	SH
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Sincerity

Fig. 9 a

PR:	
S –	H
HS	SH
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Insincerity

Fig. 9 b

2) Mistakes. We shall say that a *mistake* obtains whenever any marker has the opposite value of that of the marker just above it in the column. For instance, in fig. 6, S does not recognize the PR, so the marker *S* is –, but H thinks he does, so *HS* is +. Clearly H is mistaken here. And the fact that H is the one who is mistaken is reflected in that the marker which has the opposite value of the marker just above it is one that *begins* with H. In fig. 8 there are no less than 5 mistakes, as expressed by the opposition between the values of the markers *S* and *HS*, of *HS* and *SHS*, of *H* and *SH*, of *SH* and *HSH*, and of *HSH* and *SHSH* respectively. Fig. 10 is the same as fig. 8, with the five mistakes pointed out.

PR:



Same as fig. 8, with mistakes pointed out
Fig. 10.

3) 'One-up-ness'. This intuitive concept, so lucidly explored in the works of Stephen Potter, can be applied to any situation where one and only one party is mistaken about something. In (1), (3), (5), and (6) S is mistaken on some point or other; in (2), (4), and (6) H is mistaken. We will then say that in (1), (3), and (5) H is *one-up,* whereas in (2) and (4) S is one-up. Any diagram where one and only one party is seen to be mistaken represents a situation which is *one-up for the other party.*

4) Communicative balance. This concept is relative to the previous one in that it simply describes any situation in which *no* party is mistaken about anything. This implies that only diagrams in which all markers in each column have the same value describe situations of communicative balance. It is easy to see that there are only 4 such situations out of the possible 256, namely (a) the one where both columns have only + (the 'standard situation'), (b) the one where the left hand column has only + and the right only –, (c) the one where the left hand column has only – and the right only +, and (d) the one where both columns have only –. What kinds of situations are depicted in the latter three will be clearer in the light of the subsequent discussion.

5) Solidarity and non-solidarity. These concepts, so vitally important in the business of everyday life, also play a rôle in that part of it which has language as its medium. We have seen that there is a principle of solidarity (or in Cicourel's phrase, 'reciprocity') built into every speech act, in that whatever is presupposed should belong to the BA of *both* parties if it is to hold. Or, in other words: whoever presupposes something does so not just on his own behalf, but also on his hearer's. This being so, we thing it natural to use the term *non-solidarity* in any situation where *S presupposes something but nevertheless assumes that H does not recognize it.* This kind of S–behaviour is at variance with the fundamental principle of solidarity (or reciprocity); whenever H senses that S is behaving like this, his intuitive reaction will be that S is not being 'fair'. In the situations described above, we have cases of non-

has been seen through by H, that is to say, H rightly suspects that S's behaviour shows non-solidarity; on the other hand, there is the case of (6), where H is nourishing the *false* suspicion that S's behaviour is an instance of non-solidarity. (It is in fact something else, which will be defined below as *deception.)*

The term non-solidarity clearly answers to intuitions in cases such as (2) and (3) where S presupposes something which he does not believe belongs to the BA of H. But what of the converse case, i.e., where S is making a PR which he himself does *not* recognize, but which he nevertheless expects H to recognize? This too seems to run counter to the nature of linguistic communication in some way. Intuitively, we might say that in such a case S is 'humouring' H; but to *humour* someone is certainly no way to show one's solidarity with him, and he might well be disappointed when he finds out.[3]) We shall then say that this kind of S-behaviour is an instance of non-solidarity also; and this leads us to a simple definition of the concept in terms of our diagram: *whenever the markers S and SH have different values,* we have an instance of *non-solidarity on the part of S.* (There is no such thing as non-solidarity on the part of H, as he, by definition, is not making any overt transactions; and the moment he says something, on whatever PR, he is not H any more, but S.) The two kinds of non-solidarity are shown in fig. 11 a and b.

PR:	
S +	H
HS	SH -
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Non-solidarity (ordinary)

Fig. 11 a

PR:	
S -	H
HS	SH +
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Non-solidarity ('humouring')

Fig. 11 b

Some qualifications to this definition of non-solidarity still seem called for. Whatever S might do that seems less than fair may be partially or entirely excus-

3) It is true that what we here call humouring may sometimes be just the thing called for and hence not deviant. Suppose that I do not believe in the legality of divorce; and that you are divorced and married a second time. Now in talking to you I will surely not use the expression *your wife* to refer to your *first* wife; I will use it to refer to your *second* wife, whom *you* call your 'wife'. Such 'humouring' is really the same as 'politeness' or 'tact', and it ought to be appreciated as such by you. My reason for doing it may be that your new wife does not know my stern views on divorce. But supposing that everyone does, my politeness in speaking in a way which you know I don't find appropriate might quickly lose its effect, and might indeed incur the suspicion of mockery. (The situation here discussed was suggested to us by John Lyons.)

able *if S expects H to realize what S is doing* – that is to say, if S does not *count on* H to make a mistake about that. Thus, if *S* is + and *SH* –, S's 'guilt' is somewhat attenuated if *SHSH* is also –; then at least S's utterance cannot be called a deliberate attempt to mislead H (see the definition of 'deception', below). But still S's behaviour is highly problematic (see the definition of 'bullying', below). On the other hand, in the second type of situation, that where we have *S* – and *SH* +, there is a circumstance which may exonerate S of guilt entirely, namely if the marker *SHS* is also –, that is, if S does not *expect* H to believe that he, S, recognizes the PR. There is no attempt at deception or bully-behaviour in this. What we have then, on the contrary, is a case of

6) Rhetorical behaviour. We shall say that S's behaviour is rhetorical whenever the markers *S* and *SHS* are both –. (Cfr. fig. 12.) This means, in essence, that S is not sincere *and* that he expects H to be aware of this.

PR:	
S –	H
HS	SH
SHS –	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Rhetorical behaviour

Fig. 12

The latter part of the definition is crucial. Anyone who has tried to give the concept of 'irony' serious thought will understand this. Irony is not just 'saying something one doesn't mean', but doing it on the assumption that the hearer will *understand* that one does not mean it. This may be effected either by incorporating various overt 'irony markers' in the utterance or its paraphernalia – or S may make the assumption simply by counting on H's previous knowledge of him. These phenomena, however, are outside the scope of this book. We want merely to define the criterion of irony (and other rhetorical forms of behaviour).

As the criterion has to do only with the assumptions of S, it will be clear that our definition also covers cases where the rhetorical behaviour is abortive, for example because H does not *realize* that S does not expect to be taken seriously, i.e.,when *HSHS* is +, although *SHS* is –; if in such a case the marker *HS* is –, then it means that H thinks S is just being insincere, but H does not see the irony (or whatever it is); if on the other hand the marker *HS* is also +, then not only does H miss the irony, he even misses the insincerity. These two cases are shown in fig. 13 a and b.

PR:	
S -	H
HS -	SH
SHS -	HSH
HSHS +	SHSH

H is aware of insincerity but misses rhetorical behaviour.

Fig. 13 a.

PR:	
S -	H
HS +	SH
SHS -	HSH
HSHS +	SHSH

H misses both rhetorical behaviour and insincerity.

Fig. 13 b.

While the latter situation is perfectly familiar to us all, the former perhaps needs exemplification. Suppose that I am at a party where someone is carrying on with first names for all sorts of eminent personages. Suppose then that in order to *make fun* of this obnoxious character, assuming that he is just being naïve, *I* start referring to Dr. Kissinger as *Henry* and the like. Suppose you are at the party too, and as you happen to know I am *not* on intimate terms with Dr. Kissinger, you suppose that I am making a fairly stupid attempt to impress everyone, including you. But in fact I *expect* you to understand that I don't know Dr. Kissinger; and if you did understand this, you would not take me to be a mere name-dropper, but rather an ironist whose aim was to make fun of the other fellow. In fact, your fun and mine would be greatly increased, if for instance the fellow I was making fun of thought I was being sincere, while everyone else thought I was bluffing, so that you were the only one who understood me.

Achieved rhetorical behaviour. We have seen that *S* - in conjunction with *SHS* - means *attempted* rhetorical behaviour on the part of S. Now if his attempt is not to be abortive, there must be no mistake about any of these two things. In other words, *HS* and *HSHS* must both be - as well.

We are now able to define *achieved rhetorical behaviour* by the feature that *all markers in the left hand column have the value -.*

Now within the category of achieved rhetorical behaviour we may concentrate on two types, namely those two where a situation of communicative balance obtains. For this to be the case, all markers in the *right* hand column must also have the same value, either + or -.

Suppose they are all +. What do we have then? We have a case where S is rightly taken by H to be rhetorical about something which belongs to the BA of H. S rightly assumes that it belongs to the BA of H, and H is well aware of that, and S is counting on that awareness. The conclusion seems inescapable: S is *making fun of H,* and H knows it, and there is no mistake anywhere (cfr. fig. 14).

PR:

S -	H +
HS -	SH +
SHS -	HSH +
HSHS -	SHSH +

Rhetorical behaviour: S makes fun of H[4])

Fig. 14

What if both columns are all – ? Is not this the acme of perversion? That may be so, but only if one thinks that *acting* is perverse, for what we have here is simply S playing an act with H, whereas the previous case was S playing an trick on H.

A good example of this ultra-negative situation is that of two political leftists cracking jokes which are only funny if an extreme rightist point of view is presupposed, such as anti-Semitic or anti-Negro jokes. This kind of behaviour may be described as *cynical.* It is obvious that a leftist would hardly make such jokes if either *SHS, SH* or *SHSH* were +, for that would mean either that he expected to be taken for an actual extreme rightist, or that he felt he was among enemies who might get the impression he was just humouring them.[5]) The 'cynicism' situation is shown in fig. 15.

PR:

S -	H -
HS -	SH -
SHS -	HSH -
HSHS -	SHSH -

Stylistic behaviour: cynicism

Fig. 15

---

4) Notice that this diagram also describes the situation discussed in footnote 3, where S's politeness, the moment it is realized that he is *just* being polite, is in danger of being seen as attempt to make fun of H.

5) It might seem that 'cynicism' is too loaded a term, as this kind of behaviour on the part of S and H might also be adopted with a view to some third party in order to be, e.g., socially accepted. However, we have, for simplicity's sake, chosen to take account of only two parties in the act of communication – the speaker and the hearer addressed.

7) Bullying. What about the situation where the left hand column is all + and the right hand column all -? (Cfr. fig. 16.) We have already intimated above that it should be called 'bullying'. Why? Because S is *aware* of the fact H does not recognize the PR *(SH* is -); however, S does not think he is deceiving H, as he expects H to be *aware* of this fact *(SHSH* is also -); but still he perseveres with his PR and is serious about it, as he does not expect H to think he isn't (*SHS* is +). So not only is S showing non-solidarity, he also does not care whether he is caught in doing it; and he means no fun. The combination of *S* and *SHS* + and *SH* and *SHSH* -, then, is the mark of *attempted bullying,* as we have it,e.g., with a boarding school teacher persistently asking difficult questions to a given boy in a Latin that he does not expect the boy to understand, and not caring whether the boy realizes this latter fact.

PR:	
S +	H -
HS +	SH -
SHS +	HSH -
HSHS +	SHSH -

Bullying

Fig. 16

An actual instance famous in the sociolinguistic literature is that of Dr. Alvin Poussaint, a Black psychiatrist who reports the following conversation with a policeman:

(44) *'What's your name, boy?'*
the policeman asked.
'Dr. Poussaint. I'm a physician.'
'What's your first name, boy?'
'Alvin'
(quoted from Ervin-Tripp 1969).

(Commentary: *Boy* is, in the words of Ervin-Tripp, "a social selector for race . . . which neutralizes identity set, rank, and even adult status". While the first occurrence of this form of address may not have been an instance of bullying, the second decidedly is, because S has by now been given to understand that H does not recognize this form of address as appropriate: H's answer is 'non-deferential' in that he does not give his first name, and in that he gives his title, thus implying that the form of address he would regard as appropriate in the subsequent exchange is Title + Last Name. However, the policeman bullies him by

repeating *boy*. Even if H had not expressed non-deference, S would have known that the second *boy* was not appropriate in any case, since it also presupposes that the identity of the addressee is unknown to the speaker.)

Another example of bullying involving a verbal as well as a referential PR is that of a man who is wooing a woman saying to his rival:

(45) *Quit bothering my girl, will you?*

8) Deception. We have a reminiscent, but distinct case in a situation known from films and serials showing police brutality: that of the unscrupulous police detective persistently asking a suspect that he thinks may be innocent questions like:

(46) *But WHY did you kill your wife, Meyer?*

or

(47) *WHAT did you kill her with?*

The PR in these X-questions is "you did kill her". We are putting the case that the policeman makes this PR without himself recognizing it. In other words, he is insincere (the marker *S* is -); but he is not displaying non-solidarity, for *SH* must necessarily be - too (S cannot assume H to recognize that he killed his wife when S does not himself assume that H did it). However, S is breaking another rule (which is why we call him 'unscrupulous'): he is trying to bully H into *humouring* him by letting H understand that he, S, recognizes the PR *(SHS* is +) although in fact he does not. He thus expects H to make a mistake; for *SHS* + means that S expects *HS* to be + in spite of the fact that *S* is -.

This clearly is just one instance of a more general phenomenon for which *deception* is an apt name. Deception, then, occurs *whenever a given marker beginning with S and the marker two levels below it have different values.*

Two types of deception are shown in fig. 17 a and b. The type shown in 17 a is exemplified in (45)–(47) above; the type shown in 17 b is exemplified by the behaviour of the name-dropper, section VII, (2)–(5).

PR:	
S -	H
HS	SH
SHS +	HSH
HSHS	SHSH

Fig. 17 a

PR:	
S	H
HS	SH -
SHS	HSH
HSHS	SHSH +

Fig. 17 b

Two types of deception

9) Suspicion. As deception is by definition a type of S-behaviour, we might ask whether there is a symmetrical concept designating a type of H-behaviour or H-attitude. That is to say, we are looking for a feature common to all

situations where a given marker beginning with H and the marker two levels below it have different values. This feature we will call *suspicion.* Of suspicions there are two kinds, as shown in fig. 18 a and b.

PR:	
S	H –
HS	SH
SHS	HSH +
HSHS	SHSH

Suspicion of mistake

Fig. 18 a

PR:	
S	H
HS –	SH
SHS	HSH
HSHS +	SHSH

Suspicion of deception

Fig. 18 b

a) The suspicion of a *mistake,* which is what we have if *H* is – but *HSH* + (or the converse). More importantly, there is

b) The suspicion of *deception,* which we have, e.g., when *HS* is – but *HSHS* +; for this means that H is assuming that *S* is – while at the same time *SHS* is +, i.e. H assumes S to behave in a way which has already been defined as deceptive.

Of course, with this assumption as with any other there is the question as to whether it is true or false. But as the assumption is here a twofold one, it only holds true if both assumed states of affairs in fact obtain. If, for example, we have *HS* – and *HSHS* +, and if both *S* and *SHS* are +, then H's suspicion of deception is false, for S is not even being insincere; if, on the other hand, *S* is in fact –, but *SHS* in fact also –, then H's suspicion is wrong again, for he is now missing the fact that S is being rhetorical (ironical or the like).

10) Achieved and abortive S-behaviour. These two terms have been used without formal definition in the above discussions. This is because their formal definition is relative to a fundamental distinction between types of S-behaviour which can only now be established. The distinction is that between *deceptive* S-behaviour and what we may call *straight* S-behaviour. Given this, we shall say that *straight S-behaviour is achieved if and only if neither party makes any mistakes;* otherwise it is abortive. On the other hand, we shall say that *deceptive S-behaviour is achieved if and only if S is not mistaken about anything, while H is mistaken on the point (or points) where S expects him to be mistaken;* otherwise it is abortive, and we may then say that S has been seen through. It will be seen that it is *ex hypothesi* impossible for communicative balance to obtain in a situation in which S is being deceptive. On the other hand it will be seen that straight S-behaviour is achieved if and only if communicative balance obtains.

Examples of achieved straight S-behaviour are the situation types illustrated in the diagrams shown in fig. 2, 14, 15 and 16 above. These four diagrams at the same time illustrate the four possible types of communicative balance. Examples of achieved deceptive S-behaviour will be found in fig. 4 and 6.

IX. JUST HOW COMPLEX ARE PF SITUATIONS?

The above discussion may have produced an impression of tortuousness and deviousness in the explication of matters that one is inclined to think are fairly simple. The general mode of reasoning and some of our examples may have appeared much more involved than called for in the description of actual speech events. But this impression we think is unwarranted. It may be due, among other things, to the fact that the capacity of the human brain for making replicative operations is much greater than its capacity for *explicating* such operations. For instance, if an experienced poker player were asked to explicate the reasoning that made him either call, raise or fold in a given important situation, he would doubtless find the explication much more difficult than the actual making of the decision. Similarly, one would probably find his explication well-nigh impossible to follow. The same would hold, e.g., for a diplomat's strategy in negotiation or any other process crucially involving a process of mutual estimation between the parties.

To show that we have not reached the limits of complexity yet, and to substantiate the claim that even highly esoteric variants of our diagram describe recognizable situation types, we shall choose a variant of very high complexity and attempt to show that the phenomena illustrated in it belong to what is practically everyday experience.

PR:

S -	H +
HS +	SH -
SHS -	HSH -
HSHS +	SHSH +

Fig. 19

Let us assume S is saying:

(48) *Well, I keep telling you to watch out for them Commies and Niggers, don't I?*

thus presupposing a nomenclature which is only appropriate within a system of rightist-racist BA.

The amount of misunderstanding in the situation represented is almost staggering. S is being rhetorical in that he does *not* recognize the nomenclature he presupposes and intends this to be known. But H is taking him in earnest insofar as H is mistaken about both these things. H in fact *has* the PR among his BA, but he is assuming S to think that he hasn't. And S in fact does make this mistake, but this is not a case of non-solidarity as the PR does not belong to S's own BA although H thinks so.

H is close to thinking that S is trying to bully him in the sense defined above; if we introduced the fifth-level marker *HSHSH* (cfr. fig. 20 a and b), designating H's assumption about *SHSH,* and if it were –, then it would mean that H was thinking that S (neglectful of the fact that H already recognizes the PR) was making a fullfledged attempt at bullying him.

PR:	
S –	H +
HS +	SH –
SHS –	HSH –
HSHS +	SHSH +
	HSHSH –

Fig. 20 a

PR:	
S –	H +
HS +	SH –
SHS –	HSH –
HSHS +	SHSH +
	HSHSH +

Fig. 20 b

Introducing the fifth-level marker *HSHSH* (see text)

If on the other hand *HSHSH* were +, it would mean that H were suspecting S of deception of some kind, and he would be right, for in fact the marker *SH* and the one two levels below it have different values *(SH* – and *SHSH* +).

One more concept: perfidy. But what strange kind of deception is it that we have here? S's behaviour ought perhaps to be called *perfidy* (as a subtype of deception), for what he is attempting is to make fun of an attitude that he does *not* think H has – but it is precisely on this last point that he is trying to deceive H. S *wants* H to think : "O dear! He is scoffing at the rightist attitude, thinking that I am a rightist! How awful!" And this is perfidy on the part of S, for S does *not* really think that H is a rightist. So in fact S is trying to be one-up on H by putting him in a state of profound discomfort caused by what he thinks S takes him for.

One more concept still: manipulation. But as we have already seen, all this is wasted effort on the part of S, for H understands none of it and is thinking something like: "Well, I'll be damned if he isn't trying to bully me into a position which he doesn't know that I hold already!" However, in H's eyes the deception which S is guilty of (since *SH* is – and *SHSH* +) looks quite different (still sup-

posing that *HSHSH* is +). H thinks that S is bullying, but he also thinks that S is trying to conceal it (H assumes that S thinks: "Now I hope he doesn't find out that I *know* he isn't a rightist"); and if S manages thus to conceal his attempt at bullying (that is, if *HSH* is actually + although *SH* is –), then S has a chance of making H *comply* in order to humour S. What *HSHSH* + means in this case is that H is suspecting S of employing precisely this deceptive strategy.

If we define it as *concealed bullying,* it will also seem natural to choose for it the term *manipulation.* As this concept is intuitively recognized as being of the first importance in everyday communication, we might perhaps, by way of excursion, offer an example of it. Suppose a politician is asked:

(49a) *Mr. Politician, do you think Britain should leave the Common Market?*

and comes up with the answer:

(49 b) *I think that we should take care not to be rash*

which indeed he might well do, then there is a clear implicature, namely that *leaving the Common Market =being rash.* If this were *not* the case, then not only would the 'answer' be completely redundant (the lexical meaning of *rash* includes that it is something which one should take care not to be), but the discourse would also be incoherent (note here the relationship between the PR of relevance and coherence). Thus while the 'answer' in itself is indisputable, the real controversial issue at stake (namely that *leaving the Common Market =being rash)* is tucked away in a PR. Now the reason why a politician should do a thing like this is that he wants the audience to *comply* with the PR. He knows well that a large part of the audience does not in fact recognize the PR; that is, *SH* is –. *But he does not want anybody in the audience to know this:* that is, *SHSH* is +. He wants to be thought of as – at worst – slightly naïve; and he wants to trick H into adopting the PR out of a well-meaning attempt to establish a situation of communicative balance.

It will be seen that the two concepts perfidy and manipulation form a pair in that S attempts,the same kind of deception in both *(SH* is –, but S counts on H to be mistaken about this, that is to say *SHSH* is +). However, S's own vantage point is different in the two cases: S is behaving *perfidiously* when he does not recognize the PR himself and intends H to know this (*S* and *SHS* are both –), but he is attempting to *manipulate* when he does recognize the PR and counts on H to know this (*S* and *SHS* both +). Fig. 21 a and b shows these two kinds of S-behaviour in diagram.

PR:	
S -	H
HS	SH -
SHS -	HSH
HSHS	SHSH +

Perfidy

Fig. 21 a

PR:	
S +	H
HS	SH -
SHS +	HSH
HSHS	SHSH +

Manipulation

Fig. 21 b

X. FURTHER QUESTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

The example shown in fig. 19 has led us to consider two further features that may characterize speech events in distinctive ways: perfidy and manipulation. Also, it has helped to substantiate the claim that *any* variant of the diagram is likely to represent an actual and distinct type of speech event. Finally, the example has opened up two further considerations.

First, we have seen that in order to describe even such a virtually everyday speech event as 'suspicion of manipulation', we had to introduce a fifth level in the diagram, namely in the case of the marker *HSHSH*. This substantiates the claim (see section V) that there is no logical limit to the number of levels that may be necessary to account for a given speech event. But there are psychological limits, just as, e.g., there are psychological limits on the capacity of the human brain for the embedding transformation (cfr. Chomsky 1965, chap. 1). Probably not even the most subtle mind ever makes replicative assumptions in speech events involving more levels than, say, six (for an example of this, see the appendix). More precisely, in any speech event all values of markers below a given level n are simply reproductions of the values on the level n and are not taken into account by S and H. We will not commit ourselves to a 'maximum' value of n, but we would claim to have proved that $n = 5$ is certainly nothing out of the ordinary.

The dynamic aspect. We had occasion, in the example of the politician (49), to touch on what we may call the *dynamic* aspect of PF situations, namely the question of what may *develop* out of the situations which we have described in purely static terms. A name-dropper evidently intends a higher estimation of him to result in his hearers. A manipulating politician evidently hopes that the PR he is making is going to be adopted in some way by hearers who do not recognize it already. And this brings us to a problem which we have ignored so far, but which is decisive for the *dynamism* of PF situations, namely: what does it mean that a given PR is *not* recognized by a given party? The sign '–', which we have chosen to represent this state of affairs, in fact stands for at least two

different things. I) In those cases where the PR is that an entity referred to should be sufficiently identified for the CF in question to come about, a party (let us concentrate on the hearer) may *lack the knowledge required.* II) In those cases where there is no problem about knowledge, but where recognizing the PR means *acknowledging the validity* of something, H may *fail* to acknowledge it. But this again may mean two things. A) He may *contest* the validity of the PR and hold it to be false. B) He may stand *neutral,* being unwilling to commit himself as to whether the PR is true or false.

Again, in both cases IIA and IIB, there are two possibilities. 1) The PR may be *new* to H in the sense that he did not know until he heard the utterance that S recognized the PR. 2) It may be *known* to him already that S recognized this particular PR.

Finally, there is a fourth distinction of importance for the dynamism of PF situations, namely whether either S or H is *dependent* on the other. a) S is dependent on H if H is free to withdraw from the communication any time he wishes; b) H, on the other hand, is dependent on S if S is free to force his communication on H any time he wishes. Naturally in most normal speech situations something in between these extremes is the case.

The large variety of developments in PF situations that is circumscribed by these four criteria deserves a treatment of its own; in this context, two examples may suffice, both belonging to type II, i.e.,to the type where recognizing the PR is to acknowledge the validity of something rather than to know something.

1) The first example may be described as the 'II-B-1-a' situation, in that H stands *neutral* to a PR which is *new* to him in a situation where he is free to *withdraw* from the communication any time. What would happen then is most likely that H would take advantage of the opportunity to glean *insight* into the BA of S. Let us say that H is a linguist who is studying the productivity of language,'making notes of imaginative new slang expressions and the like. We say 'insight' rather than 'information', for what one experiences in hearing somebody express PR which one did not know is not a statement to the effect that this or that hitherto unknown thing is *valid;* rather, one witnesses the speaker *behave* in a way that is new and possibly striking. That is, the emphasis is not on the tenets that the speaker seems to acknowledge as valid, but rather on the fact that he expresses them presuppositionally and not explicitly. Let us briefly mention Louis Hjelmslev's concept of *connotation* (Hjelmslev 1943); that is precisely the sign-function where *the fact that* a given content (C_1) is conveyed by a given mode of expression (E_1) (e.g., presuppositionally) is, taken together, an expression (E_2) for a content (C_2) of a different nature: we may say that this fact is seen as a behaviour which embodies the personality of the speaker.

This way of reading signs is comparable to that of the reader of literature. (For a slightly different, but interesting account of the relationship between the concepts PR and connotation, see Ducrot 1973a.)

The emphasis might also be on 'information' rather than 'insight', however. Then the hearer's attitude is less aesthetic, less set on the experience of fascinating verbal behaviour, and more anthropological: its aim is now to become acquainted with those terms and tenets through which S construes the world, and this study might just as well use as its material explicit statements made by S.

But note that in both instances, there is no tendency on H's part to *adopt* the attitudes reflected by the PR of S. H is an observer who has come for information or insight, and it is essential that he is independent of S. In fact H is not just independent of S, but probably also one-up on him, in so far as S is assuming, naïvely, that H recognizes his PR, and that all in all a situation of communicative balance obtains. In fact it does not.

2) The second example is the 'II-A-2-b' situation, i.e., H directly contests the validity of the PR, which is well *known* to him, but which is made by S in a situation from which H is *not* free to withdraw. The instance of Dr. Poussaint, as quoted under 'Bullying' (section VIII.7 above) is revealing. Dr. Poussaint himself has reported how the situation developed owing to the mode of address to which he was subjected by the policeman:

"As my heart palpitated, I muttered in profound humiliation. . . For the moment, my manhood had been ripped from me. . . No amount of self-love could have salvaged my pride or preserved my integrity . . [I felt] self-hate" (quoted from Ervin-Tripp 1969). Extreme as such instances are, they show that if H is coerced by S to partake in a communication involving PR which he rejects, then it may well be felt by H that he has, by his participation, in fact acknowledged them — with all the loss of self-esteem that such a thing may involve.

These two examples, illustrating what kind of developments PF situations may occasion, should serve to prove that here is another neglected dimension of the PR problem beyond those to which this paper has been devoted — and it is one which may well deserve to be studied in its own right.

APPENDIX: A COMPLICATED CASE

Grice (1969), in a discussion of whether his concept of 'Utterer's Meaning' involves an infinite regress of a vicious kind, is worried that each replicative assumption on the part of an interlocutor "imposes a restriction, requires that a further condition be fulfilled" (p. 157). This is exactly parallel to what we have been maintaining; all the markers in each of our two columns are mutually independent variables in defining types of PF situations. Grice's worry is that if in fact each new level of replications raises an independent condition that must be fulfilled, and if logically the replication can go on for ever, then a speaker would incessantly be involved in calculations far beyond the capacity of any human brain. The way out of this quandary is of course, as was hinted above, that speakers and hearers stop making conscious calculations on a fairly shallow level, assuming that beyond a certain depth the same sign (+ or –) will just keep recurring endlessly. Grice's own solution is essentially the same, except that he is oniy concerned with Utterer's Meaning, that is to say, all those markers in our diagram which end with an S. One should not, he holds, require the Utterer to have an endless series of "backward-looking" intentions, but rather require him *"not* to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions" (1969, p. 159). The kind of situation that Grice would bar is that in which *"U* [Utterer] intends *A* [Audience], in the reflection process by which *A* is supposed to reach his response, *both* to rely on some 'inference-element' (some premise or some inferential step) *E and* also to think that *U* intends *A not* to rely on *E" (ibid.).* But the kind of situation defined here is exactly that where a given marker beginning with *S* and the marker two levels below it have different values, i.e.,such situations where S is guilty of what we call *deception.* However, we know that such situations occur all the time; and they are only "counter-examples" in the sense that they defy the notion that S's series of replicative assumptions is always an altogether "innocent" affair, as Grice has it (p. 157). Indeed, Grice himself cites an example of what we would call deceptive S-behaviour, suggested to him by Stephen Schiffer, and a shockingly complex one at that. It is a putative counter-example to Grice's claim that it is hard to contruct situations which will force the addition of clauses involving further iterations of *"U* intended *A* to think that . ." The situation is this: *"U* sings 'Tipperary' in a raucous voice with the intention of getting *A* to leave the room; *A* is supposed to recognize (and to know that he is intended to recognize) that *U* wants to get rid of *A. U,* moreover, intends that *A* shall, in the event, leave because he recognizes *U*'s intention that he shall go. *U*'s

scheme is that *A* should *(wrongly)* think that *U* intends *A* to *think* that *U* intends to get rid of *A* by means of the recognition of U's intention that *A* should go. In other words *A* is supposed to argue: *'U* intends me to *think* that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing, but he really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing.' The fact that *A,* while thinking he is seeing through *U* 's plans, is really conforming to them, is suggested as precluding one from saying, here, that U *meant* by the singing that *A* should go" (pp. 157–8).

This analysis needlessly complicates things. The message *Get out* is not encoded according to conventions of the kind embodied in natural languages, so this example does not involve linguistic communication in its typical form. Nevertheless, it can be analyzed with the descriptive apparatus we set up to describe PF situations, since all types of human communication involve conditions more or less analogous to PR. The 'PR' that is relevant here is that the message constituted by S's singing has the meaning 'Get out'. All that Grice's explanation amounts to is that S himself knowns the meaning of the code-message, i.e., the marker *S* is +; further, he intends H to know this, i.e. *SHS* is +. Further, he intends H to know that *SHS* is +, i.e. *SHSHS* is +; but there is really no need to take this fifth-level marker into consideration at all, for what we have in the left column is simply a + that keeps reiterating. However, Grice now asks: "How is *A* supposed to reach the idea that *U* wants him to *think* that *U* intends to get rid of him by the singing?" The answer seems easy: if S's singing is not only annoying, but *demonstratively* so, then H is bound to realize that it is intended to drive him out (thus we have *HS* +); S in his turn is aware of this *(SHS* is +), and there is no reason why his calculations should go any further than that. However, the problem of how H can be expected to understand the code-message *Get out* certainly does arise when Grice introduces this additional complication: "One might suppose that *U* sings in a particular nasal tone which he knows not to be displeasing to *A,* though it is to most people. *A* knows that *U* knows this tone not to be displeasing to *A,* but thinks (wrongly) that *U* does not know that *A* knows this. *A* might then be supposed to argue: 'He cannot want to drive me out by his singing, since he knows that this nasal tone is not displeasing to me. He does not know, however, that I know he knows this, so maybe he wants me to think that he intends to drive me out by his singing.' " (p. 158). Now it may be true have S could hardly expect H to go through a calculation as involved as this; but in any case S's unlikely expectation is easy to depict in our diagram. H, curiously enough, likes the singing, so it is not to him a natural Get out-signal, i.e., the marker *H* is –. This S knows, curiously enough, so *SH* is –. Now H knows this, so *HSH* is also –. This is turn S knows,

so *SHSH* is –. However, H is mistaken about *SHSH,* i.e.,*HSHSH* is +. At least that is what S is *counting* on him to be. i.e., the sixth-level (!) marker *SHSHSH* is +. Now the contrast between *SHSH* – and *SHSHSH* + answers to the necessary and sufficient condition for deceptive S-behaviour. S is counting on H to make a mistake. As Grice point out H would, paradoxically enough, have to be very clever to make this mistake. However, while this kind of deceptive S-behaviour will rarely succeed, it can be attempted. We can prohibit such behaviour, as Grice wants to, but only in a moral, not in a logical sense. The example is illustrated in fig. 22; for another discussion of it, see Schiffer (1972), pp. 22–4, and for a discussion of a possible 'cut-off' point to the regress, se ibid., pp. 24–30.

PR:

S +	H –
HS +	SH –
SHS +	HSH –
HSHS +	SHSH –
SHSHS +	HSHSH +
	SHSHSH +

Grice's "Tipperary"-example

Fig. 22

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